{"id":12105,"date":"2020-07-15T10:43:11","date_gmt":"2020-07-15T14:43:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/?p=12105"},"modified":"2020-07-15T10:43:11","modified_gmt":"2020-07-15T14:43:11","slug":"karen-ng-hegels-concept-of-life","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/2020\/07\/15\/karen-ng-hegels-concept-of-life","title":{"rendered":"Karen Ng, Hegel\u2019s Concept of Life"},"content":{"rendered":"

Karen Ng, Hegel\u2019s Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic<\/em>.<\/em> Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; 319\u00a0pages. ISBN: 978-0190947613.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Reviewed by Emmanuel Chaput, University of Ottawa.<\/em><\/p>\n

Karen Ng\u2019s Hegel\u2019s Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic<\/em> constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary neo-pragmatist readings of Hegel. Ng does not merely follow the footsteps of her illustrious predecessors, but sheds new light on the constitutive role of life and purposiveness in Hegel\u2019s philosophy, and particularly in his Science of Logic<\/em>. According to Ng, exploring the purposiveness theme in Hegel allows us to avoid \u201ctwo disadvantages of the apperception view\u201d (13) associated with the works of Robert Pippin and Robert Brandom: 1) the overemphasis on Kant\u2019s Deduction argument, which the post-Kantians associated with subjective idealism; and 2) the partial and \u201canti-naturalist\u201d (13) understanding of self-consciousness, which nevertheless remains one of the <\/em>central concepts of the apperception view. As Ng writes: \u201cthe self-consciousness theme itself is fundamentally misunderstood and incomplete without placing it within the context of the purposiveness theme.\u201d (13, see also 289) Ng is also critical of Brandom\u2019s reading of Hegel as a strong inferentialist, rather siding with Paul Redding\u2019s view of Hegel as a weak inferentialist (see inter alia<\/em> 189, 216). As we see then, Ng\u2019s book is a significant contribution in the full sense of the expression, as it seeks to further the neo-pragmatist reading of Hegel, which places the issue of self-consciousness and freedom at the core of Hegel\u2019s philosophy, while demystifying the apparently dogmatic metaphysics of the text. And she does so by focusing on a concept often dismissed by Pippin and Brandom. (see 13\u201314) Ng argues, using a typically neo-pragmatist terminology, \u201cthat the Idea puts forward the thesis that life opens up the space of reasons itself.\u201d (10)<\/p>\n

The purposiveness of life needs to be translatable into the very structure of judgment or, to say it otherwise, \u201cpurposiveness is an enabling condition of judgment,\u201d (25) which in turns allows the existence of the space of reasons itself. For Ng, \u201cHegel ultimately grounds his entire system of reason on the basis of internally purposive form. Life opens up the space of reasons and defines the space of judgment, making intelligibility as such a problem and possibility.\u201d (234)<\/p>\n

Ng will place a particular emphasis on the concept of judgment within Hegel\u2019s logic. In fact, in Chapter 5, Ng will argue that \u201cthe chapter on \u2018Judgment\u2019 is arguably the keystone of the section [on \u2018Subjectivity\u2019] and captures what is most important concerning Hegel\u2019s\u2026assessment of the forms of the subjective Concept.\u201d (186) This is interesting, since we tend to focus rather on the figures of the syllogism, the concluding chapter of the section, as the key to understanding Hegel\u2019s logic. (The pun between \u201csyllogism\u201d [Schluss<\/em>], \u201cconcluding chapter\u201d [Schlusskapitel<\/em>], and \u201ckey\u201d [Schl\u00fcssel<\/em>] is intended.) The focus of the author on the notion of judgment within Hegel\u2019s logic is connected to her aim of reconciling Hegel\u2019s \u201cLogic of the Concept,\u201d the third book of the Science of Logic <\/em>which pertains to \u201cSubjective Logic,\u201d with Kant\u2019s Critique of the Power of Judgment<\/em>. In fact, for Ng, \u201cHegel\u2019s Subjective Logic can be interpreted as his version of a \u2018critique of judgment\u2019.\u201d (9, see also 164)<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the first part of the book focusses on the way Hegel inherited his concept of purposiveness as internal<\/em> purposiveness from Kant by showing how, already in Kant, purposiveness plays a key role in the constitution of conceptual understanding and judgment (see Chapter 2). In that respect, Ng largely remains in tune with the neo-pragmatists, who see in Hegel a worthy successor to<\/em>, rather than a critique of<\/em> Kant, but she nevertheless stands out from their standard view by showing the philosophical interest of the third Critique <\/em>and its unity with Kant\u2019s Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>, whereas for Pippin, the last of Kant\u2019s Critiques <\/em>is merely of historical interest. (see 5\u20136, n.5)<\/p>\n

In Chapter 3, Ng shows how Kant\u2019s influence on Hegel is channeled by H\u00f6lderlin\u2019s and Schelling\u2019s critiques of Fichte into what she calls Hegel\u2019s \u201cspeculative identity thesis.\u201d First articulated in the Differenzschrift<\/em> of 1801, the thesis can be summed up in four propositions: 1) there is, for the living, an identity between being and life; 2) self-consciousness is irremediably related to life (which implies, for Ng, the refutation of subjective idealism and the introduction of a somewhat naturalist stance); 3) life has the character of immediacy, even though it should not be mistaken for the one-sided immediacy usually criticized by Hegel; and 4) the relation between life and self-consciousness establishes the fundamental boundaries of a logical \u201cspace of reasons.\u201d (See Chapter 3, especially 77\u201381) According to Ng, the speculative identity thesis remains a central feature of Hegel\u2019s mature system and \u201cwill provide the framework for [her] interpretation of the Science of Logic\u2026 <\/em>.\u201d (81) Ng offers a continuity interpretation of Hegel\u2019s philosophy from his early publications to his final system, showing how his speculative identity thesis, initially developed in the Differenzschrift<\/em>, still informs his \u201cLogic of the Concept,\u201d as she exposits it in the second part of her book. H\u00f6lderlin\u2019s and Schelling\u2019s critiques of Fichte will remain an essential aspect of Hegel\u2019s take on logic and his anchoring of self-consciousness (or the Fichtean \u201cI\u201d) with the concept of life:<\/p>\n

Ultimately, in combining H\u00f6lderlin\u2019s critique of Fichte with his own, Hegel means to demonstrate that the unity of the subject, the unity of the object, and <\/em>the unity of subject and object are grounded in the logical form of life. This transforms two fundamental idealist theses that are at the heart of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy: first, \u201cthat the structure and unity of the concept <\/em>is the same as the structure and unity of the self<\/em>\u201d, or the unity of the I; and, second, that the unity of the Concept or the I is the ground of the unity of the object, the source of the very form of objectivity. In transforming these two well-known idealist arguments, Hegel\u2019s goal is to claim that the unity of the Concept qua subject, self-consciousness, or the I, and the unity of the Concept qua object, are both grounded in the unity and teleological form of life. (172\u201373)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

To do so, Hegel will not only need Kant\u2019s concept of inner purposiveness, but also a stronger concept of life, which may remotely be inspired by H\u00f6lderlin and Schelling, but nevertheless develops into something that is very specific to Hegel. (258)<\/p>\n

In that regard, Ng sometimes seems to overstate the depth of Hegel\u2019s debt toward his predecessors, especially Kant. As an example, Ng seems to go too far, in my opinion, when she tries to argue that Hegel\u2019s doubling of the Idea into life<\/em> and cognition <\/em>is \u201cHegel\u2019s attempt to replace Kant\u2019s doctrine of the two stems of knowledge, where life <\/em>and cognition<\/em> take the place of intuitions <\/em>and concepts.<\/em>\u201d (249, see also 253) Even though Ng agrees that, \u201cit would be misleading to try to map all of Hegel\u2019s terminology and framework directly onto its potential Kantian counterparts,\u201d (253) she seems at the moment to give way to that tendency.<\/p>\n

Although Ng\u2019s argument may at times overemphasize Hegel\u2019s debt to Kant\u2019s transcendental arguments and philosophy (see inter alia<\/em> 178, 188), she brilliantly explains some of the most challenging pages of the Logic<\/em>. Interestingly, the difficulty of certain sections of the \u201cLogic of the Concept\u201d is not the result of the abstractness of the topic, but because at this point in the Logic<\/em>, we are at a crossroad where the seemingly abstract determinations of thought and the concrete character of life meet. It is difficult to set such a meeting point between concept, judgment, syllogism, and life. Attempts to do so have either fallen on the side of raw technicality or on the side of an apparently self-evident and intuitive resolution to the problem (consisting in making life the material condition of possibility, judgment, concept, or syllogism\u2014a solution whose evidence-like character fails to comply with the demonstrative rigour of Hegel\u2019s Logic<\/em>). In that regard, Ng\u2019s analysis of the \u201cSubjectivity\u201d, \u201cObjectivity\u201d, and \u201cThe Idea\u201d sections of the Subjective Logic throughout Chapters 5 through 8 of this text is a welcome contribution that avoids the double pitfall.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Karen Ng, Hegel\u2019s Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; 319\u00a0pages. ISBN: 978-0190947613. \u00a0Reviewed by Emmanuel Chaput, University of Ottawa. Karen Ng\u2019s Hegel\u2019s Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary neo-pragmatist readings of Hegel. Ng does not merely follow the footsteps of her illustrious predecessors, but […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[19,49],"class_list":["post-12105","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reviews","tag-hegel","tag-pragmatism","et-doesnt-have-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-05-07 11:04:06","action":"Draft","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category"},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12105","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12105"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12105\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12106,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12105\/revisions\/12106"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12105"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12105"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12105"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}