{"id":13304,"date":"2024-07-04T13:24:06","date_gmt":"2024-07-04T17:24:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/?p=13304"},"modified":"2024-07-05T13:39:45","modified_gmt":"2024-07-05T17:39:45","slug":"jacob-mcnulty-hegels-logic-and-metaphysics-cambridge-cambridge-university-press-2023-288-pp-isbn-9781009067805","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/2024\/07\/04\/jacob-mcnulty-hegels-logic-and-metaphysics-cambridge-cambridge-university-press-2023-288-pp-isbn-9781009067805","title":{"rendered":"Jacob McNulty, Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics"},"content":{"rendered":"

Jacob McNulty, <\/span>Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics<\/span><\/i>.<\/span> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023; 288 pp. ISBN: 9781009067805.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reviewed by Gregory S. Moss, Chinese University of Hong Kong.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Jake McNulty\u2019s <\/span>Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics<\/span><\/i> is an excellent work of philosophy that successfully demonstrates the metaphysical import of Hegel\u2019s logic. While it will benefit specialists in Hegel\u2019s logic, its style makes its line of argumentation accessible to non-specialists. Unlike those who render Hegel’s thought intelligible by modeling it on Aristotle or Kant, McNulty reads Hegel on his own terms without sacrificing intelligibility. Without a doubt, the book should be read by any serious student of Hegel\u2019s logic. Despite some points of disagreement, I believe it makes a real contribution to the ongoing conversation about the metaphysical significance of Hegel\u2019s logic.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In his Preface and Introduction, McNulty approaches German Idealism through a central problem: <\/span>the logo-centric predicament <\/span><\/i>(10). If truths are justified by laws of formal logic, what justifies these laws themselves? One cannot assume these laws in order to justify them without circularity. Yet they are not self-evident, for they can be challenged by counterexample (11), and so they require a defense. On McNulty\u2019s reading, Hegel solves the logo-centric predicament by grounding formal logic in an ontological theory of categories (20-21).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This reading has a Heideggerian inspiration (26), whereby ontology grounds formal logic. However, in Hegel\u2019s case, the ontological theory of categories is still logical. What is the character of the ontological-logical ground of formal logic? To avoid circularity, Hegel\u2019s dialectical method of justification is \u201cpreformal,\u201d \u201cnoninferential,\u201d and \u201cprepredicative\u201d (25). Unlike traditional theories, this method\u2019s basic \u201cunit of analysis\u201d is the concept, such that \u201cthe dialectical method operates on individual concepts\u201d, not judgments. One of the books\u2019 highlights is McNulty\u2019s thesis that Hegel\u2019s categories are <\/span>necessarily instantiated<\/span><\/i>, such that every category is a \u201cnew ontological proof.\u201d Accordingly, Hegel\u2019s concepts are \u201cnonempty\u201d and self-instantiating. They operate like the concept of God, for each \u201cvouchsafes its own instantiation\u201d (xiv). Finally, McNulty courageously admits that \u201cHegel is a critic of the law of non-contradiction\u201d (xv). McNulty convincingly argues that without a direct assault on the principle of non-contradiction, Hegel cannot solve the logo-centric predicament.\u00a0 Finally, the book successfully demonstrates that Pippin\u2019s Kantian reading of Hegel is fundamentally misguided, for McNulty takes seriously Hegel\u2019s claim that his own philosophy is a departure from subjective idealism (32-38).\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

In Chapter One, McNulty explicates one of Hegel\u2019s chief critiques of formal logic: it violates its own standard of justification (54). While formal logic requires that judgments be justified by principles of inference, it cannot itself be justified by such principles without circularity. In general, formal logic is finite: its justificatory powers are inherently limited, for <\/span>they do not apply to themselves<\/span><\/i>. According to McNulty, traditional approaches (like Aristotle\u2019s) justify logic by presupposing a given object, e.g., thinking or experience, from which it abstracts the categories, forms of judgment, and logical laws (55-56). While formal logic cannot justify its approach through any mediated process, it relies upon some form of <\/span>immediacy<\/span><\/i>. It presupposes not only an object about which it thinks but also a method (like abstraction) by which it produces the content of the science. Since formal logic cannot ground itself, it must be groundless or have a non-formal ground. Against the formal-logical approach, Hegel\u2019s logic aims to justify its claims without presupposition (57), by privileging neither a given object nor a given method.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Chapter Two, McNulty provides a unique reconstruction of Hegel\u2019s \u201cswimming objection\u201d against Kant\u2019s philosophy. Because Kant \u201cwants to know before one knows\u201d, his philosophy falls victim to \u201cvicious circularity\u201d (78). McNulty argues that, like Aristotle, Kant\u2019s logic cannot ground itself, and is problematically grounded in an empirical source. On this reading, Kant\u2019s treatment of the categories is incomplete, for it is grounded in an act of abstraction from the content of experience (81). McNulty underscores Fichte\u2019s insight that the first <\/span>Critique <\/span><\/i>cannot<\/span> ground itself, but can be grounded on a higher source than the transcendental. In the rest of the chapter, McNulty reads Fichte and Hegel as providing different accounts of this higher source.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

McNulty then discusses Fichte\u2019s account of the origin of the categories (83-90). Fichte grounds logical principles, like the law of identity, A=A, in the self-identity of the I=I. Although Fichte grounds categorial knowledge in intellectual intuition of the \u201cI am,\u201d from the latter he cannot deduce anything further. McNulty reconstructs Hegel\u2019s critique that Fichte fails to give a \u201ccompelling reason\u201d why the \u201cI entails not-I\u201d (90). On McNulty\u2019s reading, while Hegel rejects Fichte\u2019s first principle, Hegel grounds logical knowledge in a \u201cdifferent first principle, Being\u201d (91). Both Kant and Fichte <\/span>presuppose Being<\/span><\/i>. McNulty reasons that because Being is \u201cconceptually primitive\u201d or \u201cimmediate\u201d (92) and the most \u201ccomprehensive,\u201d (98) it is the ultimate foundation of logical knowledge. All categories are forms of being and would be impossible without it.\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

Because Being is \u201cfundamental, comprehensive, and necessarily instantiated\u201d it can \u201cserve as the point of departure.\u201d Following tradition, Hegel conceives of Being as God or the \u201c<\/span>ens realissimum<\/span><\/i>\u201d.\u00a0 Moreover, because \u201cBeing is a distinctive type of whole whose (proper) parts are the beings\u201d it is \u201cnecessarily instantiated\u201d and \u201cnecessarily nonempty\u201d (93-5, 98). Unlike traditional versions of the ontological argument, since Being works as the ontological ground of logical cognition, the structure of its self-instantiating character cannot be syllogistic (97). In this way, McNulty defends the view that Hegel\u2019s logic is a <\/span>reiterative<\/span><\/i> ontological argument that begins from the concept of being. The ontological argument is the true critique of the categories, for it is due to the self-instantiating structure of Hegel\u2019s speculative-ontological logic that he can derive categories without relying upon traditional logic. Kant\u2019s mistake is to treat the concept of God like the representation of 100 dollars: the latter doesn\u2019t imply existence, whereas the former does (105-107). While Being is the necessary object of pure, <\/span>a priori<\/span><\/i> thinking, in the course of the logic thinking itself appears as one of Being\u2019s necessary forms. As such, Hegel\u2019s logic is a \u201cmetaphysics of epistemology\u201d (105). McNulty summarizes his view nicely: Hegel\u2019s logic is divorced from psychology, eschews the transcendental, and operates as post-critical ontology (101).<\/span><\/p>\n

I agree with McNulty on much of the major interpretive points, especially his recovery of the insight that the ontological argument is already at work in the logic of being. Hegel\u2019s logic certainly is a post-critical metaphysics, that eschews transcendental form. Its categories are existentially implicative (self-instantiating), and do not operate syllogistically. However, there are a number of more contentious points about which one might hold reservations. First, we shouldn\u2019t read McNulty\u2019s book as giving a complete historical account of the development of Hegel\u2019s view. Indeed, one figure is conspicuously absent from it: Schelling. While McNulty is right that Hegel is \u201credeploying\u201d the concept of being in \u201cthe form of Spinozism,\u201d (95) Schelling had already attempted to develop a form of idealism that reanimated Spinoza\u2019s thought into a philosophy of freedom. Not only did Schelling argue in the <\/span>System of Transcendental Idealism <\/span><\/i>that Fichte\u2019s subjective idealism needed completion by a form of <\/span>objective idealism<\/span><\/i>, but he also argued that the first principle ought to be both analytic and synthetic\u2014a view Hegel would later adopt in his concept of method and is clearly discernible in his concept of the Absolute Idea. Indeed, Hegel\u2019s realism is deeply indebted to Schelling\u2019s realism. Naturally, this isn\u2019t inconsistent with McNulty\u2019s argument, for his Heideggerian inspiration is very close to the spirit of Schelling\u2019s realism.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, McNulty reads Hegel\u2019s account of the beginning of logics as a \u201cmore abstract version\u201d of Fichte (99). On this reading, Hegel doesn\u2019t repudiate first principles. However, if Hegel operates without presuppositions, for \u201cer darf nichts voraussetzen\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Logik<\/span><\/i>, 69) it no longer posits (<\/span>Setzung)<\/span><\/i> any principles in advance (<\/span>voraus<\/span><\/i>). While Fichte\u2019s first principle is a posit (<\/span>Setzung<\/span><\/i>), what is presuppositionless (<\/span>Voraussetzungslos<\/span><\/i>) must repudiate any original posit<\/span>.<\/span><\/i> Read this way, a presuppositionless logic should repudiate all first principles\u2014it should be foundation-free. Following Richard Dien Winfield\u2019s understanding of presuppositionlessness, it\u2019s unclear how Hegel (on McNulty\u2019s reading) remains presuppositionless. While McNulty acknowledges that Hegel\u2019s logic is without presupposition, it remains unclear <\/span>how<\/span><\/i> this is compatible with his view that Hegel\u2019s logic is grounded on Being as a first principle. (As Maker argues, Hegel himself appeals to the <\/span>Phenomenology of Spirit<\/span><\/i> in his account of the presuppositionless beginning. For more see Maker, <\/span>Philosophy.<\/span><\/i> For Hegel\u2019s discussion of the role of phenomenology in the beginning of logic, see Hegel, <\/span>Science<\/span><\/i>, 46-47.)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Finally, although McNulty is absolutely right that being instantiates itself, one might ask <\/span>how<\/span><\/i> the concept instantiates itself. McNulty argues that being is self-particularizing because it\u2019s a whole whose proper parts are beings. Because the concept of the whole and its parts first arises within the <\/span>Doctrine of Essence<\/span><\/i>, McNulty is right that \u201cto call it a whole would be premature\u201d (104). Given that it is premature to consider being a whole, we cannot appeal to the concept of the whole to understand its self-particularizing character. At best, such an explanation must be <\/span>retroactive<\/span><\/i>, and cannot explain being\u2019s self-instantiating character as a member of the <\/span>Doctrine of Being<\/span><\/i>. Here Hegel provides a clue: empirical predicates such as \u2018one hundred dollars\u2019 fail to exhibit self-referential structure (Hegel, <\/span>Science<\/span><\/i>, 64\u201365). Because <\/span>Being itself has being<\/span><\/i>, it must be an instance of itself. While the concept of one hundred dollars is not one hundred dollars, <\/span>the category of Being is itself a being<\/span><\/i>. In short, self-reference appears to play a more significant role in Hegel\u2019s ontological argument than McNulty acknowledges. While McNulty will acknowledge the importance of self-reference in Chapter Five (180-185), its connection with the ontological argument remains opaque. While McNulty\u2019s approach to Hegel\u2019s logic as a reiterative ontological argument is unequivocally correct, the account should be supplemented by an account of how <\/span>self-reference is reiteratively applied<\/span><\/i> to successive categories (See Moss, <\/span>Hegel\u2019s<\/span><\/i>, 260-265.)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter Three further motivates and elucidates the structure of Hegel\u2019s speculative logic by considering his critique of pre-critical metaphysics. McNulty observes that this metaphysics takes judgment as the bearer of truth and syllogism as the method for proving a judgment to be true (199). Ultimately, these features of pre-critical metaphysics originate in Aristotle\u2019s logic, not Scholastic metaphysics (114), and are uncritically adopted by Kant. Although Kant evaded Scholasticism\u2019s religious dogmatism, he succumbed to a form of logical dogmatism (118). Because judgment connects two concepts, its truth presupposes one has accurately identified the meaning of the concept in the subject position. Thus, any logic operating with judgment as its ultimate truth-bearer presupposes the truth of a concept, for which it cannot account (112). Against tradition, Hegel\u2019s logic takes the concept as the fundamental truth-bearer. On his account, truth is <\/span>the agreement of a concept with itself<\/span><\/i> (121). The truth of judgments depend upon more fundamental truths: the truths of concepts.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Because the ultimate truth-bearer is the concept, Hegel\u2019s method for establishing truth cannot remain unchanged. Indeed, because syllogisms are composed of judgments, not merely concepts, his method cannot remain syllogistic. Such a method must be both <\/span>a priori<\/span><\/i> and non-inferential. Accordingly, Hegel must develop a novel method\u2014dialectic\u2014for establishing truth. Since dialectic operates on concepts whose truth is presupposed by judgment, the logic operates on truths that are \u201cpre-predicative.\u201d Although truths such as \u201cThe Absolute is Being\u201d appear predicative, and appear to exhibit judgmental form, the subject in such cases is an \u201cempty placeholder\u201d (126).<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel\u2019s dialectical method is constituted by the \u201ctwin strategies\u201d of \u201cimmanent critique\u201d and \u201cdeterminate negation\u201d (122). The former establishes that the concept is self-contradictory; the latter frees the concept from contradictory form. Consequently, a new category arises, and the process begins anew and a new contradiction arises. The language of \u201cstrategies\u201d may misleadingly imply that Hegel applies a separate method to a content that is given independently of the method. Again, we might suggest introducing the self-referential feature of the concept as a helpful remedy. Through self-referential predication, the concept <\/span>applies to itself<\/span><\/i>, and needn\u2019t be conceived as a method which is applied to independent content. <\/span>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

McNulty notes that Hegel\u2019s dialectic, as a <\/span>unity of synthesis and analysis<\/span><\/i> (128), must engender contradictions, but these dialectical contradictions are not incompatible judgments. While formal-logical contradictions \u201cpertain to judgments of the form \u2018S is P,\u2019\u201d dialectical contradictions (or \u201cproto-contradictions\u201d) (127) differ in kind. A dialectical contradiction obtains when a concept <\/span>contradicts itself. <\/span><\/i>Since the PNC governs judgments and precludes the truth of <\/span>contradictory judgments<\/span><\/i>, the PNC doesn\u2019t govern dialectical thought. More generally, since dialectic is the form of speculative logic that undergirds all formal-logical thinking, dialectic doesn\u2019t presuppose the PNC or any other formal principles.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter Four primarily focuses on how Hegel re-thinks the categories as infinite. McNulty specifies two kinds of finitude: the finitude of categories towards each other and towards the world (133). A category is finite vis-\u00e0-vis the others if it\u2019s not semantically comprehensive, thereby excluding other categories. A category is finite vis-\u00e0-vis the world \u201cif it is possible that it should fail to be instantiated\u201d (138). Hegel\u2019s categories are infinite in both senses. Thus, Being applies to all categories, for all categories are beings, and so is semantically comprehensive. And, since Being is self-particularizing, it cannot fail to be instantiated. McNulty explicates the role of semantic finitude in Kant and shows how the sense of finitude vis-\u00e0-vis the world informs Kant\u2019s critique of our knowledge of the transcendental ideal (140-163).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, there\u2019s another sense of finitude implied by McNulty\u2019s account. Hegel defines the finite as what is internally limited, i.e., as what contains its own negation (Hegel<\/span>, Science<\/span><\/i>, 101). Formal logic is finite in this sense, for although it contains rules for justification, it cannot be logically justified by them. Formal logic thus isn\u2019t logical\u2014it contains its own negation. Finite categories are <\/span>concepts that cease to be<\/span><\/i> in virtue of their own internal limitations<\/span><\/i>. Although this sense of finitude isn\u2019t incompatible with McNulty\u2019s account, his account should be further supplemented with Hegel\u2019s treatment of finitude in the <\/span>Science of Logic<\/span><\/i>.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

McNulty astutely observes that if a category is infinite, it can overcome Kant\u2019s antinomies, for there are no antithetical categories with which it can conflict. Because Kant conceives of categories as finite, his reflections on the unconditioned produce unresolved antinomies. McNulty is right that the impasses of traditional metaphysics depends upon assuming that concepts are finite. On Hegel\u2019s view, Kant\u2019s critique of the ontological argument begs the question. While the concept of one hundred dollars doesn\u2019t imply its existence, the concept of \u201cthe whole of existence\u201d does imply its existence (158).\u00a0 While \u201cBeing is the foundation of everything that follows\u201d (163), each new category reformulates the ontological argument.<\/span><\/p>\n

In Chapter Five, McNulty explains how Hegel grounds formal logical laws on his ontological theory of the categories (166). Since logical laws should apply regardless of their subject matter, and Hegel\u2019s ontological categories apply to all beings, he can ground the generality of logical laws on the corresponding generality of ontological categories (174). For instance, the law of identity is grounded on the category of identity. Because Hegel thinks the law of identity can be converted into the PNC, Hegel grounds the PNC in the category of identity (190). Just as identity is self-relation, <\/span>e.g.<\/span><\/i> A=A, so is the PNC expressed as self-relation: A cannot be A and not A (177). Hegel grounds such laws in his <\/span>Doctrine of Essence<\/span><\/i>, which recasts non-relational categories of Being into relational forms. Since the categories are self-developing, just as each category gives rise to the next, so too will each law (176).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Because the category of identity negates itself, so too must the PNC. Consequently, McNulty appears to endorse a <\/span>dialetheic<\/span><\/i> reading of Hegel\u2019s logic. McNulty is right that Hegel rejects the PNC, for it is \u201cincompatible with what he takes to be the correct metaphysical theory of the nature of reality\u201d (169). Indeed, the PNC conflicts with \u201cthe metaphysical principle that there is real opposition in the world\u201d (172). McNulty clearly reconstructs the dialectics of identity. First he shows that for any identity, A=A, A must be distinct from itself to express the identity relation. Thus, self-identity presupposes non-identity. Second, McNulty argues by self-reference: given that identity is not difference, it excludes difference.\u00a0 However, identity must <\/span>be different from difference <\/span><\/i>(183), and is characterized by difference. Insofar as identity is different, it is not distinct from difference. Thus, identity falls into self-contradiction, for it both excludes difference and is defined by it. Hegel\u2019s dialetheic logic of self-reference concerns the relation of <\/span>the concept to itself<\/span><\/i>, forming a class of self-referential paradoxes distinct from typical examples employed by dialetheists, like the liar paradox (184). Because identity differs from itself, the Absolute is re-defined as <\/span>self-opposition<\/span><\/i>, which is inherently contradictory: McNulty argues that: \u201cAs we saw, each category (pair) can be reformulated as a definition of the Absolute. In this case, \u2018the Absolute is opposition\u2019. Once we recall that the Absolute is an empty placeholder, and that opposites are (inter)defined as negations of one another, however, we get a contradiction. The contradiction: X is F and not-F\u201d (189). <\/span> Through the self-negation of the category of identity, McNulty demonstrates how the dialectics of identity undermines the PNC. Consequently, Hegel\u2019s grounding of formal logic entails<\/span> the transformation<\/span><\/i> of formal logic. Although McNulty doesn\u2019t explicitly discuss this, Hegel grounds a <\/span>new law<\/span><\/i> of self-contradiction on the inherently self-oppositional character of the Absolute. Because the Absolute is self-contradictory, one can establish the formal law that \u201cAll things are in themselves contradictory\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Science<\/span><\/i>, 11).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Although the PNC ultimately cedes to the principle of self-contradiction, we should note an ambiguity in McNulty\u2019s treatment of contradiction. In Chapter Four, McNulty claims that, for Hegel, philosophy\u2019s task consists in an \u201cattempt to identity an infinite category whose definition is coherent\u201d (139-140). In Chapter Three, after presenting truth as the concept\u2019s self-agreement, he argues that a category is untrue when self-contradictory (122).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While McNulty apparently favour a dialetheic treatment of Hegel\u2019s logic, other passages indicate otherwise. McNulty cites EL \u00a733 to defend the reading of untruth as inconsistency. However, the passage\u2019s context informs us that Hegel is discussing metaphysics <\/span>qua <\/span><\/i>\u201cDogmatismus\u201d (Hegel,<\/span> Enzyklop\u00e4die<\/span><\/i>, \u00a732, 98). More specifically, he is addressing \u201cden ersten Teil dieser Metaphysik\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Enzyklop\u00e4die<\/span><\/i>,<\/span> \u00a733, 99) as ontology. Here Hegel doesn\u2019t endorse the view that truth is consistency. Rather, he considers what the concept\u2019s self-agreement <\/span>would be<\/span><\/i> if we adhered to the understanding. Consequently, the sentence appears in the subjunctive: \u201cWenn die Wahrheit also weiter nichts <\/span>w\u00e4re<\/span><\/i> [my emphasis] als der Mangel des Wiederspruchs\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Enzyklop\u00e4die, <\/span><\/i>\u00a733, 100). Indeed, for the understanding, which advances a one-sided view of truth, the concept must eschew all contradiction, but this passage says nothing about <\/span>truth for reason. <\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

In Chapter Five, McNulty demonstrates how speculative truth requires transcending the truth of the understanding. Nevertheless, we\u2019re left wondering whether McNulty thinks Hegel \u201cultimately arrives at an infinite category whose definition is coherent.\u201d Is the absolute idea such a category? Or does McNulty hold that Hegel fails in his attempt to find an infinite category whose definition is consistent, such that absolute truth must be <\/span>dialetheic in form<\/span><\/i>? This is a question every reader of Hegel must ask themselves, and it\u2019s natural that it arises while reading <\/span>Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics<\/span><\/i>. By my lights, the latter option is preferable, for Hegel himself declares that <\/span>every concept <\/span><\/i>ultimately gives way to <\/span>contradiction:<\/span><\/i> \u201cevery determination, anything concrete, every concept, \u2026, pass over into elements which are contradictory\u201d (Hegel,<\/span> Science<\/span><\/i>, 384).<\/span><\/p>\n

Indeed, the dialetheic reading offered in Chapter Five enables Hegel to account for <\/span>absolute determinacy<\/span><\/i>. The Absolute\u2019s absolute determinacy requires the truth of self-contradiction. Since the Absolute is determinate, it must be determinately related to what it is not. To be determinate, it must be <\/span>other to what it is not<\/span><\/i>\u2014relativity. However, since there\u2019s nothing other to the Absolute, it cannot be determinately related to anything but itself. It is only determinate if it is its own other\u2014if it is <\/span>other than itself<\/span><\/i>. It must <\/span>exclude itself.<\/span><\/i> Only via self-negation and self-contradiction can the Absolute <\/span>be true to itself<\/span><\/i> as <\/span>absolutely determinate<\/span><\/i>. As I read McNulty, the true self-correspondence of an absolute category is only achieved in self-contradiction. Indeed, reading McNulty we learn not to equivocate on self-correspondence in the cases of the understanding and of reason.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Chapter Six, McNulty proceeds to explicate the concept\u2019s structure in Hegel\u2019s logic of subjectivity. While Kant accounts for the categories by appealing to formal logic, Hegel inverts the order, deriving formal logic from the categories (202). While the logic of being concerns non-relational categories, the logic of essence concerns relational categories. Finally, the logic of the concept synthesizes these forms, for it has the structure of <\/span>mediated immediacy<\/span><\/i> (205). The concept is a <\/span>self-mediated<\/span><\/i> totality. Here McNulty draws upon the metaphor of growth and maturation to illustrate the structure of Hegel\u2019s concept. Unlike traditional accounts, the concept isn\u2019t only a universal, but is constituted by universal, particular, and individual (226). McNulty illustrates this structure with an empirical concept. The concept of a horse is a universal, but also a particular concept falling under the concept of mammal. Since the individual is the unity of universal and particular, the concept of the horse is also an individual.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While McNulty takes this example from Hegel, it has significant limitations. Since every categorial form following being is a form of the ontological argument, so must the logic of the concept. (Hegel explicitly identifies the transition from the concept to objectivity as an ontological argument. See Hegel, <\/span>Science<\/span><\/i>, 325.) For Hegel identifies the concept with God, who is self-particularizing. (See Hegel: \u201cThe concept of God realizes itself most fully as this universal that determines and particularizes itself\u2014it is this activity of dividing, of particularizing and determining itself [\u2026]. This is the concept as such, the concept of God\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Lectures<\/span><\/i>, 324).) Since the concept of God is self-instantiating, and the concept as such is the concept of God, the concept instantiates itself. As Hegel tirelessly re-iterates, the concept is an instance of itself: \u201cJeder der Momente im Begriff ist aber zugleich das Ganze, der ganze Begriff\u2026Hier ist der Begriff an und f\u00fcr sich, jedes ist Totalit\u00e4t\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Vorlesung<\/span><\/i>, 177, 160).\u00a0 For Hegel, \u201ceach of the moments of the concept is as much the whole concept as it is a determinate concept and a determination of the concept\u201d (Hegel, <\/span>Science<\/span><\/i>, 601). Because the concept is an instance of itself, it is both universal and particular. Since the singular is the unity of both, the concept is singular.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, \u2018horse\u2019 isn\u2019t self-instantiating. Like \u2018one hundred dollars\u2019, \u2018horse\u2019 is a false concept, for it lacks self-reference. Thus, while McNulty is right that \u2018horse\u2019 exemplifies the threefold structure of universal, particular, and singular, it\u2019s the concept in <\/span>self-alienated form<\/span><\/i>, for it doesn\u2019t self-particularize. It\u2019s worth noting that the doctrine of concept is <\/span>not<\/span><\/i> a doctrine of formal conceptuality. Although Hegel\u2019s ontological categories ground the formal-logical, the concept isn\u2019t merely formal-logical. Ultimately, I think McNulty\u2019s account <\/span>can<\/span><\/i> accommodate the ontological argument in the logic of the concept, for it starts from the insight that being\u2014in all its forms (including the concept)\u2014is a self-realizing, self-particularizing totality.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span> McNulty concludes by reminding us that neither Aristotle\u2019s nor Kant\u2019s philosophies are self-comprehending (237). Hegel\u2019s logic is self-comprehending, for it self-divides (245) and completes itself with the Absolute Idea, an Absolute subjectivity that knows itself, that corresponds with the God of Aristotle\u2019s <\/span>Metaphysics<\/span><\/i>. (245) While one can argue that Hegel\u2019s logic <\/span>retrospectively<\/span><\/i> relies upon formal logic, this wouldn\u2019t nullify the prospective account according to which the <\/span>non-formal ontological categories<\/span><\/i> ground formal-logical structures (246-248).<\/span><\/p>\n

To summarize, <\/span>Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics<\/span><\/i> successfully defends a dialetheic vision of Hegel. McNulty\u2019s dialetheic vision shows us Hegel is a post-critical metaphysician\u2014a critical realist whose idealism isn\u2019t opposed to being but is constituted by being\u2019s own self-development. McNulty\u2019s Hegel is the real Hegel: a dialetheic monist who isn\u2019t afraid to tell hard truths to an unwilling world.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel, G.W.F. (1984). <\/span>Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion<\/span><\/i>, trs. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart. Berkeley: University of California Press.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel, G.W.F. (1986a). <\/span>Wissenschaft der Logik<\/span><\/i> I. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel<\/span>, <\/span><\/i>G.W.F. (1986b). <\/span>Enzyklop\u00e4die der philosophischen Band Wissenschaften I<\/span><\/i>. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel, G.W.F. (2001). <\/span>Vorlesung \u00dcber die Logik<\/span><\/i>. Hamburg: Meiner.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hegel, G.W.F. (2015). <\/span>The Science of Logic<\/span><\/i>, trs. George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.<\/span><\/p>\n

Maker, William (1994). <\/span>Philosophy Without Foundations. <\/span><\/i>Albany: SUNY Press.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Moss, Gregory S. (2020). <\/span>Hegel\u2019s Foundation Free Metaphysics<\/span><\/i>: <\/span>The Logic of Singularity<\/span><\/i>. New York: Routledge.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Jacob McNulty, Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023; 288 pp. ISBN: 9781009067805. Reviewed by Gregory S. Moss, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Jake McNulty\u2019s Hegel\u2019s Logic and Metaphysics is an excellent work of philosophy that successfully demonstrates the metaphysical import of Hegel\u2019s logic. While it will benefit specialists in Hegel\u2019s logic, its […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[31,19,9],"class_list":["post-13304","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reviews","tag-german-idealism","tag-hegel","tag-metaphysics","et-doesnt-have-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-05-06 21:34:59","action":"Draft","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category"},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13304","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13304"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13304\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13308,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13304\/revisions\/13308"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13304"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13304"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13304"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}