{"id":13557,"date":"2025-02-19T10:45:32","date_gmt":"2025-02-19T15:45:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/?p=13557"},"modified":"2025-02-19T10:49:33","modified_gmt":"2025-02-19T15:49:33","slug":"somers-hall-henry-judgement-and-sense-in-modern-french-philosophy-a-new-reading-of-six-thinkers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/2025\/02\/19\/somers-hall-henry-judgement-and-sense-in-modern-french-philosophy-a-new-reading-of-six-thinkers","title":{"rendered":"Somers-Hall, Henry. Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy: A New Reading of Six Thinkers"},"content":{"rendered":"

Henry Somers-Hall. <\/span>Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy: A New Reading of Six Thinkers.<\/span><\/i> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022; 264 pages. ISBN: 978-1-316-51790-1<\/span><\/p>\n

Reviewed by Chen Yang, Hunan University.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Henry Somers-Hall\u2019s remarkable book, <\/span>Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy<\/span><\/i>, serves as a profound exploration into the philosophies of six influential French thinkers of the 20th century\u2014Bergson, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. Within its pages, Somers-Hall deftly navigates their difficult ideas, shedding light on their departure from the central tenets of German idealism. He argues that French philosophers offer alternative models of thought that transcend the limitations posed by German idealism\u2019s reliance on<\/span> judgement<\/span><\/i>. According to Somers-Hall, in the German idealist tradition \u201cdetermination in general is understood in terms of predication\u201d (4). Thus, in this tradition, anything is either determined through judgments or completely indeterminate. To respond to this judgement-centred tradition, French philosophers propose different non-judgement models of thinking to capture determinations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter one, Somers-Hall tracks the history of German idealism and argues that judgements are essential to this tradition. As Somers-Hall puts it, for German idealism, \u201cdetermination operates through the attribution of predicates to subjects\u201d (47). Indeed, judgements are so essential that the lack of judgement entails the lack of any determination for German idealists. Somers-Hall argues that even Hegel, who seeks to break with such traditional reliance on judgements, only further develops, rather than rejects, the logic of judgements (47).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter two, Somers-Hall offers a comprehensive analysis of Bergson\u2019s subtle account of thinking that can be summarized in three claims. (1) Bergson holds that there are two kinds of multiplicities: continuous multiplicity (temporal phenomena and mental states) and discrete multiplicity (spatial organizations). (2) The discrete multiplicity presupposes the continuous insofar as \u201cthe tendency towards homogeneity is a fundamental feature of our experience of a temporal world\u201d (64). (3) Judgements can only capture discrete multiplicity and they miss continuous multiplicity. If we accept both (2) and (3), Somers-Hall concludes, \u201cwe cannot think of the world purely in terms of <\/span>judgement<\/span><\/i>, but need an originary <\/span>experience of duration<\/span><\/i> through which the structures that judgement manipulates are instantiated in the first place\u201d (72, my emphasis).<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter three argues that Sartre offers a non-categorical understanding of consciousness through his analysis of intentionality. In particular, Somers-Hall explains the complex relationship between Sartre\u2019s and Bergson\u2019s analyses of consciousness. On the one hand, Sartre\u2019s \u201caccount of the difference between imagining and perceiving relies on Bergson\u2019s logic o<\/span>f <\/b>multiplicities<\/span><\/i>\u201d<\/b> (7); on the other hand, Somers-Hall shows how Sartre, committed to Husserl\u2019s analysis of intentionality, breaks with Bergson\u2019s philosophy of multiplicity. According to Somers-Hall, Sartre\u2019s major concern is that Bergson\u2019s logic of multiplicities still treats consciousness as if it were an object. Rather, Sartre proposes that we should view consciousness as \u201crelating to objects in the world\u201d (89), \u201centirely without content\u201d (92), \u201cintending towards the world\u201d (95), and thus \u201cpure transcendence\u201d (92). Somers-Hall stresses that such consciousness is \u201cnon-categorial\u201d (111), and thus the relationship between consciousness and the world is \u201cnon-categorial\u201d (112).<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter four reconstructs Merleau-Ponty\u2019s arguments for the claim that categorial thought is generated from perception itself (113). Somers-Hall points out that the major task for Merleau-Ponty is to account for \u201cthe possibility of a meaningful world\u201d (121), given the failure of such an account by both empiricism and rationalism. To illustrate this point, Somers-Hall discusses symmetrical objects, which are crucial for both Kant and Merleau-Ponty. The basic idea is that the difference between symmetrical objects is important for human orientation, yet cannot be \u201cfully captured in <\/span>conceptual terms<\/span><\/i>\u201d (123); thus, human orientation in the world requires \u201ca <\/span>non-conceptual<\/span><\/i> installation in experience\u201d (124); Moreover, such non-conceptual installation, namely perception, already has \u201ca structure that is different in kind from the structure of reflection\u201d (134), and, consequently, leads to \u201ca rather different conception of the subject, synthesis, and the structure of the object\u201d (135). This new synthesis \u201coperates through the transformation of perspective\u201d (141) and relies on \u201cthe relationship between the determinate and the indeterminate\u201d (141). Somers-Hall concludes that such synthesis is, thus, <\/span>non-judgmental<\/span><\/i>, and indeed, <\/span>judgments emerge<\/span><\/i>, for Merleau-Ponty<\/span> out of perception<\/span><\/i> (146).<\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter five, Somers-Hall argues that the claim that \u201cthinking operates prior to the constitution of categorial judgment\u201d (147) is always valid for Derrida. According to Somers-Hall, Derrida explores the history of philosophy itself and reveals the logic of its sense, which \u201cdiffers in kind from judgment\u201d (148) and is usually \u201ccovered over by the structures of judgment\u201d (148). Correspondingly, Derrida\u2019s approach to the history of philosophy involves two parts: \u201cshowing the way in which philosophers institute <\/span>categorial structures<\/span><\/i>\u201d while, simultaneously, \u201ccovering over the<\/span> non-categorial ground<\/span><\/i> of these structures\u201d (148). Upon his deconstruction of the history of philosophy, Derrida aims to reveal the transcendental condition for the possibility of conceptual thought, namely, <\/span>diff\u00e9rance<\/span><\/i> (175). As Somers-Hall summarizes, <\/span>diff\u00e9rance <\/span><\/i>is \u201c<\/span>the operation of generating the differential nexus within which names gain significance<\/span><\/i>\u201d (175, my emphasis). Since <\/span>diff\u00e9rance <\/span><\/i>is logically prior to conceptual thought, it cannot be captured by the structure of judgment. Rather, <\/span>diff\u00e9rance <\/span><\/i>\u201coperates according to a logic of dissociation\u201d (175).<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter six examines both Foucault\u2019s early archaeological period and his later genealogical period, explaining how Foucault reveals \u201cthe sense underlying the categorial claims of our discourse\u201d (178). As per Somers-Hall, Foucault\u2019s early archaeological period takes up certain aspects of Kant\u2019s transcendental philosophy, but he is hostile to two of its central principles: (1) the subject as a central organizing principle and (2) the organization of thought structured by judgments (178). In opposition to both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, who consider the sites of transcendental organization as either consciousness or body, Foucault argues that both the subject and the structure of judgments are conditioned by <\/span>historical epistemes<\/span><\/i>, which are different ways in which knowledge claims can be tied together. Foucault discusses three historical epistemes: the Renaissance, the classical, and the modern. As Somers-Hall states, such epistemes \u201cprecede judgement by determining what kind of things are going to be characterized as subjects and predicates\u201d (187). Furthermore, Somers-Hall points out that Foucault in his later genealogical period argues that the power-relationship further conditions the historical epistemes in at least four ways: negation, rules, prohibition, and censorship. In this sense, both our consciousness and judgments are conditioned by the<\/span> power-relationship<\/span><\/i>, which is non-categorial.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter seven, Somers-Hall investigates Deleuze\u2019s approach to understanding \u201cdeterminations that are not structured in accordance with judgment\u201d (212). In line with Somers-Hall, Deleuze, as with other French philosophers, also explains how traditional philosophy, or as Deleuze puts it, the image of thought, relies on the judgement and covers over its genuine condition. In particular, \u201cthe process of abstraction and transposition of thinking\u201d make the communication of thought possible (216); good sense and common sense guarantee that we can recognize and represent objects. However, they simultaneously prevent us from creating any new concepts. Thus, genuine thought requires an <\/span>encounter<\/span><\/i>, which \u201cdraws us outside the strictures of common sense and representation\u201d (221). An encounter, as Somers-Hall puts it, \u201cleads us to a point where the self is dissolved, and the normal categories of reason fail to function\u201d (223). At this point, Deleuzian Ideas are revealed. Ideas are reciprocally determined, retaining no independent existence. In addition, such Ideas have neither \u201csensible form,\u201d nor \u201cconceptual significance,\u201d nor \u201cany assignable function\u201d (237). Nevertheless, such reciprocal relationship between ideas must be actualized in spatial-temporal relationships, which in turn may be captured by judgments. In this sense, the structure of judgments is generated from non-judgmental\/non-conceptual conditions, namely the Ideas.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Somers-Hall\u2019s careful interpretation of the difficult texts and insightful reconstruction of the philosophical systems of Bergson, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze are helpful for anyone who wants to understand modern French philosophy. In particular, Somers-Hall\u2019s view that all six French philosophers attempt to find non-judgmental determinations, as an alternative to the German tradition, helps us position the central project of French philosophy. However, for this project to be justified, two concerns must be addressed.<\/span><\/p>\n

First, it would be helpful for Somers-Hall to clarify the distinctions between \u201cjudgmental\u201d, \u201ccategorial\u201d, and \u201cconceptual\u201d. The differences between these terms remains somewhat ambiguous throughout the book, impacting the precision of the critique of German idealism. Although many times Somers-Hall states that the German idealist tradition is dominated by judgements, from time to time he uses \u201ccategorial\u201d to characterize this tradition (e.g., 113, 148, 157, 160, 186, 191, 200, 207, 212). In some instances, Somers-Hall even uses \u201cconceptual\u201d to characterize the target of his critique (e.g., 123, 149, 169, 172, 225). Although German idealists basically agree on what a judgement is, they disagree on what a category and what a concept is. Since Somers-Hall aims to argue that the French philosophers in question pursue a <\/span>non-categorial<\/span><\/i> and even a <\/span>non-conceptual<\/span><\/i> approach to capturing determination, it would be helpful if he could offer more clarifications of <\/span>\u201c<\/b>category<\/span><\/i>\u201d <\/b>and <\/span>\u201c<\/b>concept<\/span><\/i>\u201d<\/b>, and, thus, detail what it means to be \u201c<\/span>non-categorial<\/span><\/i>\u201d and <\/span>\u201c<\/b>non-conceptual<\/span><\/i>\u201d<\/b>. Such clarifications would determine whether the difference between French philosophy and the German idealist tradition is indeed qualitative. In short, we need to ask whether French philosophers have discovered (or invented) something <\/span>qualitatively different<\/span><\/i> from categories\/concepts to capture determinations, or whether they merely use other categories\/concepts.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, as far as I can see, Somers-Hall\u2019s project would benefit from specifying the exact problem of German idealism. The fact that German idealism is judgments-centred is not necessarily a problem. Moreover, there are two possible ways to develop this critique. First, judgements are not sufficient to capture all kinds of human experience. For instance, in the Merleau-Ponty chapter, following Kant and Merleau-Ponty, Somers-Hall points out that certain human experiences, like orientation, cannot<\/span> be captured in judgements (123). However, there are other human experiences, especially those in natural science, that can be accurately captured by judgements. In this sense, the judgement-centered German idealist tradition is at most insufficient. The second possibility is to argue that the judgement-centered German tradition is not only insufficient but also defective. For instance, in the Deleuze chapter, Somers-Hall investigates the possibility of \u201ca transcendental philosophy that provides a genuine account of the genesis of the judgement itself\u201d (211-212). Here the worry is not that judgements are insufficient to capture certain human experiences but that they are defective, since they cannot even account for their own genesis. Obviously, the second critique will be stronger, but simultaneously more difficult to justify. For instance, in the <\/span>Science of Logic<\/span><\/i>, Hegel does explain how judgements can be generated from the dialectic relationship among categories. In this case, if the second critique were to be justified, Somers-Hall would need to explain why Hegel\u2019s account fails, rather than merely describe how it differs from the French accounts.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is worth noting that both concerns are about the conceptual details of Somers-Hall\u2019s ambitious project. However, despite these concerns, Somers-Hall\u2019s book is in my opinion among one of the best on the history of French philosophy. Anyone interested in French philosophy and its interaction with German idealism will greatly benefit from its careful and astute analysis. .<\/span><\/p>\n

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Henry Somers-Hall. Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy: A New Reading of Six Thinkers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022; 264 pages. ISBN: 978-1-316-51790-1 Reviewed by Chen Yang, Hunan University. Henry Somers-Hall\u2019s remarkable book, Judgement and Sense in Modern French Philosophy, serves as a profound exploration into the philosophies of six influential French thinkers of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[73,40,84],"class_list":["post-13557","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reviews","tag-french-philosophy","tag-kant","tag-poststructuralism","et-doesnt-have-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-05-07 12:14:45","action":"Draft","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category"},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13557","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13557"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13557\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13560,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13557\/revisions\/13560"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13557"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13557"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13557"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}