{"id":14313,"date":"2026-11-16T10:51:42","date_gmt":"2026-11-16T15:51:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/?p=14313"},"modified":"2026-11-16T10:54:31","modified_gmt":"2026-11-16T15:54:31","slug":"mary-c-rawlinson-the-betrayal-of-substance-death-literature-and-sexual-difference-in-hegels-phenomenology-of-spirit-columbia-university-press-2021-264-pp-isbn-9780231199056","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/2026\/11\/16\/mary-c-rawlinson-the-betrayal-of-substance-death-literature-and-sexual-difference-in-hegels-phenomenology-of-spirit-columbia-university-press-2021-264-pp-isbn-9780231199056","title":{"rendered":"Mary C. Rawlinson, The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel\u2019s Phenomenology of Spirit"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Mary C. Rawlinson, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel\u2019s Phenomenology of Spirit<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, Columbia University Press, 2021, 264 pp. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">ISBN: 9780231199056<\/span><\/p>\n<p><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Reviewed by Omar Qui\u00f1onez, Villanova University<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are many fine entry points to Mary C. Rawlinson\u2019s insightful book, but I will focus my review of <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Betrayal of Substance<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> on how it presents \u201clife\u201d as the issue around which the narrative of Hegel\u2019s <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">unfolds. Yet as the title of the book suggests, the thematization of life also serves as an avenue to reconsider the concerns of hyper-rationalism and closure that still haunt the 1807 work. That said, whether we can call these issues a matter of \u201cbetrayal\u201d of Hegel\u2019s own philosophical commitments in 1807, as opposed to say, \u201cunresolved issues,\u201d is not a settled question, I think. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth debating and perhaps imperative.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The first three chapters of the book focus on Rawlinson\u2019s approach to reading the 1807 text. There, Rawlinson presents the concept and inner workings of life as the core problem in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology.<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> She notes, for example, that \u201c[i]f for the Greeks man was an animal capable of politics, in \u2018our time\u2019 man has become an animal whose politics and philosophy interrogate nothing less than \u2018life itself.\u2019 This will prove to have been the \u2018real issue\u2019 (<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">die Sache selbst<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">)\u201d (xxix). The phrase \u201c<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">die<\/span><\/i> <i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sache selbst<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u201d plays an almost technical role in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, summarizing the conclusion of the section on Reason that the meaning of self-consciousness is the ultimate subject matter of debate. Thus, if life is <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">die Sache selbst<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, this means that something about the inner workings of life also involves debate or negotiation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We are also told that life is best understood as a process of \u201ctwo-ing,\u201d or <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">entzweien<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, a kind of logic of \u201cbecoming divided\u201d or \u201csplitting up.\u201d On this view, life is a matter of division or multiplication, which would suggest that, with life as <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">die Sache selbst<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the book, the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> is taken to present an account of existence, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">being <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">itself, as fundamentally open-ended in character. Rawlinson calls this the \u201cmaterial infrastructure of life\u201d (xxi). This is an insightful portrayal of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology\u2019<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">s aim and especially helpful in shedding new light on the crucial \u00b682 of the introduction, where Hegel explains his reasoning for a \u201cscience of the experience of consciousness.\u201d In Hegel\u2019s eyes, experience (<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Erfahrung<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">) is the product resulting from consciousness\u2019 activity of differentiation and relation to the object of sense. If this connection is right, then <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Betrayal of Substance <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">provides new resources to highlight the existentialist basis of the \u201cshapes\u201d of consciousness that make up the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u2019s narrative. On Rawlinson\u2019s account, this drive for investigating \u201clived experiences\u201d is the result of life\u2019s, and thus <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">being\u2019s<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, own logic of division calling for self-understanding.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The first part of the book strengthens this existentialist reading of consciousness\u2019 activity through close examination of the section on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Among other topics, this includes a fascinating reconstruction of the figure of the \u201cBacchanalian revel\u201d in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, an image Hegel, perhaps surprisingly, brings up numerous times. Rawlinson tells us that \u201cHegel returns yet again to the image of the Bacchanalian revel to articulate the logic of life\u201d (38). The main reference in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> is \u00b647 of the \u201cpreface,\u201d where Hegel cites the festival to the ancient god of wine, Bacchus (\u201cDionysius\u201d for the Greeks), as a moment of ecstasy where emotions, intoxication, and movement, all work to dissolve fixed identities into the flux of the group. The Bacchanalia portrays a process similar to life\u2019s logic of \u201ctwo-ing\u201d and consciousness\u2019 differentiation: a radical sense of relationality as open-ended, breaking through individual and social barriers.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This erotic characterization of the \u201cidentity-in-difference\u201d thesis and its connection to life has a history in Hegel, appearing in his 1798 \u201cFragment on Love,\u201d almost ten years before the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. On Hegel\u2019s view, love is a \u201ctwo-ing\u201d in a complex way, for it pushes lovers to differentiate themselves, leaving behind their carved-out space of personal interests and embrace instead the commonality inherent to the loving relation. The Bacchanalian ravel is an image for thinking this open-ended existential logic of life as presented in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, which means, as Rawlinson underscores, that \u201cthe differentiated thought positions of philosophy, the historical epochs, and the phases of a life are all necessary, but they belong to a fluidity that surpasses them\u201d (xxxi).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For this same reason, however, if \u201cfluidity\u201d transcends the multiplicity of life and thought, then what is this \u201csurpassing\u201d itself and how does it relate to its multiplicity? Rawlinson\u00a0takes the separation between transcendence and transcended\u00a0to emerge early in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">,\u00a0in the Sense Certainty section that discusses how indexicals\u00a0(\u201cnow,\u201d \u201chere\u201d)\u00a0are pitted against the plurality of sense experience.\u00a0The \u201cbetrayal\u201d of sensory life is depicted as this separation becoming a fault line and that, in turn, an antinomy, culminating in Hegel downplaying life\u2019s open-endedness. The \u201cbetrayal of substance\u201d thus means that life as \u201ctwo-ing\u201d becomes, ultimately, life as organic totality.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The book presents life as self-dividing and connects this divisibility to the diversity of the experiential \u201cinfrastructure of life,\u201d which is best articulated through the science of phenomenology. The \u201corganic metaphor,\u201d as Rawlinson calls it, on the other hand, refers to the internal purposiveness of organic development, which is best suited to a system of conceptual relations. In her words, \u201c[t]he organic metaphor forestalls any possibility of being otherwise. Transgression of the logic of genetic development could never serve life, as it will have been determined in advance to be a genetic defect, a monstrous miscarriage, not a birth\u201d (xxxii). Unlike life\u2019s open-endedness, then, the organism is in principle \u201cclosed off,\u201d deploying a pre-determined code of development though itself and for itself.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Second part of the book recounts how the accumulating moments of tension as the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> progresses amount to an antinomy of life between open-endedness and organic self-development. The tension is palpable in the chapter on Observing Reason, where science searches for universals in nature to serve as confirmation of the inner rationality of nature\u2019s diversity. Life and nature appear both as the power of diversification and as the rational organization of nature into species. As Rawlinson highlights, \u201c[i]n thinking life as the genus, Hegel distinguished between the flux of becoming and the singular living beings that arise and pass away\u201d (148). Life seems to be in utter tension with itself, being fundamentally, both, mortal and immortal, materially diverse and immaterial self-same (\u201cflux\u201d), open-ended and closed off.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In part three of the book, we are introduced to the full version of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u2019s antinomy of life and the work\u2019s failure at addressing it. The <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u2019s stated aims, that is to justify and present a science of phenomenal knowing, as Hegel restates it in \u00b6808, wraps up by articulating the conceptual whole (\u201cabsolute knowing\u201d) on which the multiplicity of life \u201changs together.\u201d On Rawlinson\u2019s account, though, there is trouble here, for this \u201cwhole\u201d serves as confirmation that Hegel has not really merged life with organicity, open-endedness with internal self-development. In addressing the antinomy, he has rather subsumed<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">one under the other. This final subsumption, Rawlinson argues, begins in the Culture chapter of the Spirit section, where consciousness\u2019 only way to individualize itself is through the linguistic interpretation of its otherwise generic social roles and titles. Up to this point, the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> concerned itself with the \u201cproblem of consciousness\u201d as set out by \u00b682, namely with what it means for experience to be a process of distinguishing and relating to the object of consciousness. But Rawlinson suggests that a new story line develops here that focuses on the process through which universals in language successfully subsume multiplicity.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This is how Hegel gets to re-position the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> as a \u201cladder to the system;\u201d as a prelude to the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Logic<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, that is. As she notes, \u201c[w]hen Hegel turns from phenomenology to logic, he leaves behind the phenomenon of incommensurability that on his own account defines organic life\u201d (199). I read the argument here as saying that Hegel subsumes life under \u201corganic metaphor,\u201d thereby turning life as \u201ctwo-ing\u201d into the closed totality of internal purposive development. This means that Hegel leaves incommensurability behind, translating the open-endedness into the closed organic system of self-development. Hegel betrays his original project, therefore, choosing to address the antinomy of life through the \u201cviolence\u201d of the concept: \u201cHegel has constantly reminded us that the concept is only realized as an infrastructure of life. Yet, he has assiduously tried to tear the concept away from its adherence to the sensuous\u201d (195).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Betrayal of Substance<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> points to three examples of \u201ctwo-ing\u201d as proof of Hegel\u2019s betrayal: the sense of one\u2019s mortality, sexual difference, and the singularity of artistic creation. Each of these cases exemplifies a mode of existence that can be said has incommensurable permutations of meaning. Having subsumed multiplicity under the universality of the concept, the argument goes, these subjects play no meaningful role in Hegel\u2019s final chapters of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. Rawlinson\u2019s formulation strikes me as similar to Thomas Nagel\u2019s argument in defense of experiential facts, where a \u201cperspective-free\u201d language cannot properly present \u201cfacts\u201d whose meaning depends on being experienced by a consciousness. Such language would fail to correctly reduce experiential facts to objective facts because it would change what is unique about them.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Let me now close my discussion by asking the following: can Hegel respond to this charge of \u201chyper-rationalism\u201d that has him \u201cbetraying\u201d his own aims as presented \u00b682? One way to answer this question would be to ask for clarification on the meaning of Hegel\u2019s \u201cbetrayal.\u201d A broad interpretation of the \u201cbetrayal\u201d presents the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> as not only unable to solve the antinomy of life but as actively devaluing multiplicity, the sensuous, and the logic of \u201ctwo-ing,\u201d portraying the diversity of experience in the objective language of the concept. But one could also read Hegel\u2019s \u201cbetrayal\u201d more narrowly, as the articulation of an antinomy in the 1807 that remains unresolved, leading Hegel to move back and forth between devaluing multiplicity, the sensuous, and the logic of \u201ctwo-ing,\u201d and openly embracing them as fundamental to his definition of consciousness, existence, and even the concept itself.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In terms of the broad interpretation, there are resources in Hegel to reply to the charge.\u00a0 One example is found at the closing of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, in \u00b6802, where Hegel reiterates his commitment to the especial place of sense-experience in his theory of knowledge. Hegel\u2019s wording there recalls the Kantian maxim that \u201cconcepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind,\u201d and suggests as well that Hegel sees himself as trying to rethink Kant\u2019s \u201cmaxim\u201d in more dynamic terms. Another example is found in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Science of Logic<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, in Hegel\u2019s discussion of the \u201cconcept.\u201d We witness there an uncharacteristically poetic Hegel connecting the inner workings of the \u201cconcept\u201d (<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Begriff<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">) to the divisibility of life and that, in turn, to \u201clove\u201d as a non-violent \u201cfree power,\u201d circling all the way back to the 1798 \u201cFragment on Love.\u201d The concept is presented as the backdrop to divisibility and multiplicity, explaining how it all \u201changs together.\u201d Understood in this way, then, one could argue that Hegel remains faithful to the \u201cproblem of consciousness\u201d as laid out in \u00b682.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And yet what Hegel sees himself as doing and what he does may not be the same. <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Betrayal of Substance<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> makes a strong case, in my view, for how the model of organicity to which Hegel subscribes is in tension with Hegel\u2019s own understanding of consciousness as self-divisible. Given that the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> aims to explain the \u201cproblem of consciousness\u201d in \u00b682, it is perhaps unsurprising and yet troubling that the book progressively focuses on the \u201cunity\u201d side of the equation, on the relating of consciousness to the object, rather than on divisibility, on consciousnesses\u2019 distinguishing. Consider Rawlinson\u2019s objection to Hegel\u2019s discussion of art in the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Phenomenology<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. Though art in 1807 is for Hegel part of the religion, he shows no interest in individual artistic \u201cstyle,\u201d speaking of art and artworks as if they had only historical and social functions. That is, as if art was an instance, a sensible manifestation, of otherwise broad historical patterns. But this does not do justice to art, for we speak of \u201ca Van Gogh\u201d and \u201cHomeric poetry\u201d not because they are instances of universals but rather because these are irreducibly singular examples of artistic creation. As a form of \u201cabsolute knowing,\u201d the book is no longer trying to illustrate consciousness\u2019 \u201ctwo-ing.\u201d It has shifted to articulate and, one may argue, privilege<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">,<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> how \u201cit all hangs together.\u201d In my view, it is in the more restricted sense of an unresolved tension in Hegel that Rawlinson\u2019s judgement against the \u201cabsolute\u201d standpoint rings true: \u201c[i]n the end, there can only be one narrative of spirit, a master narrative, for the mastery of difference. Religion absorbed art: the absolute one absorbed the indelible multiplicities of style\u201d (193).<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Hegel may not be so easily labeled as a metaphysician of presence. But as Rawlinson shows, he seems to be a thinker torn between his appreciation for the diversity of experience and the explanatory potential of a self-justifying philosophical system. Putting the finger on this tension-turn-antinomy is what <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The<\/span><\/i> <i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Betrayal of Substance<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> does so well. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mary C. Rawlinson, The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel\u2019s Phenomenology of Spirit, Columbia University Press, 2021, 264 pp. ISBN: 9780231199056 Reviewed by Omar Qui\u00f1onez, Villanova University There are many fine entry points to Mary C. Rawlinson\u2019s insightful book, but I will focus my review of The Betrayal of Substance on [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[31,19,38,331],"class_list":["post-14313","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reviews","tag-german-idealism","tag-hegel","tag-phenomenology","tag-sexual-difference","et-doesnt-have-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-11-26 12:40:03","action":"Draft","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category"},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14313","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14313"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14313\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14315,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14313\/revisions\/14315"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14313"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14313"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14313"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}