Karl Rosenkranz, <\/b>Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i><\/b>. Translated by Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015; 335 pages. ISBN: 978-1-47256-885-4.<\/b><\/p>\n
Reviewed by Wes Furlotte, Dominican University College\/University of Ottawa<\/i><\/p>\n
Karl Rosenkranz\u2019s \u00c4sthetik des H\u00e4sslichen<\/i> (1853), translated in 2015 by Andrei Pop and Mechtild Wildrich as Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i>, is now available for the first time in English. This should be an occasion for optimism because there has been almost no English commentary on it despite its unique historical and philosophical significance. The thesis at the core of Rosenkranz\u2019s investigation is that ugliness functions as the dialectical negation of beauty. While a negative conception of the ugly is philosophically orthodox, Rosenkranz refuses the reductive gesture that often accompanies such convention. Ugliness, therefore, is not reducible to evil or material nature and so retains a distinct positivity that is entirely its own. Indeed, it is this protean positivity that the text explores at exhaustive length, ranging widely in the phenomena it considers from barren landscapes to body abjection, culminating in its original analysis of the bizarre form of caricature.<\/p>\n
Historically considered, Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i> functions as a transitional juncture in German aesthetic theories of the nineteenth century. Looking backward, it is indebted to the works of German Romanticism that preceded it, touching on the grotesque, the uncanny, and the irrational: those opaque regions of the world and experience explored by Hoffmann, Tieck, and others. Nevertheless, it displays itself as very much of its own decade, complementing, for instance, Baudelaire\u2019s Les Fleurs du mal <\/i>(1857). Lastly, it is anticipatory, addressing themes that would receive extensive treatment in European art and theory in the twentieth century: body abjection, absurdity, and tragi-comedy. Part of the curiosity in reading Rosenkranz is discovering what we might call a genealogy of theories of ugliness: known and obscure analysts who had also sought to establish a foothold in this \u201cdifficult province of aesthetics.\u201d (25) It was G.E. Lessing, Rosenkranz tells us, who made a \u201creal beginning\u201d with his Laocoon <\/i>(1766) by analyzing how the ugly and the nauseating in poetry and painting are capable of evoking emotions relating to the laughable and the terrible. (259) Similarly, as the scholars Margaret A. Rose and Dieter Kliche (2011) have shown, Friedrich Schlegel\u2019s essay, \u201cOn the Study of Greek Poetry\u201d (1795), can also be read as a forerunner to Rosenkranz insofar as it discusses the ugly as a moment within the development of modern art that needs to be overcome. Rosenkranz cites Christian Hermann Weisse\u2019s System of Aesthetics as Science of the Idea of Beauty <\/i>(1830) as the first study which consciously \u201cintroduced into science\u201d the concept of ugliness as a relative moment within the idea of beauty thereby introducing dialectical method and systematic concerns to the phenomena of ugliness. (259) Nonetheless, Rosenkranz diverge with his predecessors, in particular Weisse, insisting that the latter conceives of the non-idea (Unidee<\/i>) of ugliness in an overly spiritual sense, which thereby equates it with the \u201cghastly, evil, and the devilish.\u201d (259) Such an unbalanced treatment, Ronsenkranz continues, had been passed on to Weisse\u2019s followers as evidenced in Arnold Ruge\u2019s New Primer of Aesthetics <\/i>(1837), which also overemphasizes the \u201cghastly\u201d dimension of ugliness while suffering from a lack of clarity and restriction of its analysis to select works by Hoffman.<\/p>\n
These preliminary efforts, for Rosenkranz, are arbitrary and incomplete and so he writes that: \u201cthe concept of ugliness has until now been handled only in a fragmentary and incidental fashion, or else with great generality, which risks affixing the subject within very one-sided definitions.\u201d (25) Consequently, the task concerning an aesthetic treatment of ugliness becomes comprehensiveness and systematicity. Rosenkranz aims to display the \u201ccosmos of ugliness,\u201d tracing its interconnected features and forms in a self-contained system thereby offering a complete account of it. (25) Just as biology concerns itself with illness, ethics with evil, legal science with injustice, so too, for Rosenkranz, aesthetics must address ugliness. Accordingly, he asks: \u201cAn aesthetics of ugliness? and why not?\u201d (25) His approach is to determine the concept of the beautiful, which functions as the presupposition of ugliness, and then track how specific modes of beauty undergo various negations, thereby generating corresponding counter-determinations of ugliness. Rosenkranz\u2019s system involves three sections, each opening onto the other which, when taken together, constitutes a complete systematic treatment of ugliness. It begins with sections on relatively indeterminate forms of ugliness, i.e. formlessness and incorrectness, and concludes with one that results in completely determinate forms of ugliness, i.e. deformity (disfiguration). Rosenkranz significantly extends the scope of applicability of these aesthetic categories. In contrast to Hegel, not only do various natural phenomena, for instance patches of fog, fall under the purview of ugliness but, pace<\/i> Schelling and Hegel, \u201call the arts and all the epochs of art among the most diverse peoples\u201d are used to clarify the developments of these concepts and this means that no culture is excluded from the realm of the aesthetic, nor are specific periods or cultures rigidly identified with a specific type of ugliness. (25) Not only does the dialectical quality of ugliness tell us something fundamental about the internal connection between it and beauty it also realigns the focus and scope of German Idealism\u2019s aesthetic theories. Rosenkranz convincingly shows that a range of natural, intellectual, and artistic phenomena, which were once considered beneath serious philosophical reflection, now demand a systematic placement within<\/i> the aesthetics of beauty. The ugly, by extension, must be situated within the parameters of whatever is to qualify as modern art. While this might seem mundane from our contemporary perspective it misses the fact that, historically considered, such a move was quite innovative. Rosenkranz\u2019s significant realignment of German Idealism\u2019s aesthetics alone makes the text worthy of careful consideration.<\/p>\n
As Andrei Pop\u2019s introduction (1\u201322) points out, Rosenkranz (1805\u20131879) studied theology and romanticism in Berlin in the 1820s under Schleiermacher, Marheineke, and Neander. (6ff) In the late 1820s he turned to an intensive study of Hegel under the suggestion of two Hegelian teachers, Carl Daub and Herman Hinrichs, who impressed him. He eventually attended some of Hegel\u2019s lectures in Berlin meeting him prior to the latter\u2019s death in 1831. By the early 1830s Rosenkranz had already written a dissertation on the history of German literary theory and generated a habilitation thesis on Spinoza. It was during this time that he broke with romanticism, focusing on the art of the Middle Ages. Already having a post in Halle, in 1833 Rosenkranz was appointed to Kant\u2019s chair in philosophy in the remoteness of K\u00f6nigsberg. The \u201cyoungest and most historical\u201d of the Hegelians,\u00a0he wrote a biography on Hegel focusing on the relationship between the master\u2019s life and system. (9) Although Aesthetics of Ugliness <\/i>was published in 1853 Rosenkranz was steadfastly preparing for it as early as 1837, having begun a collection of caricatures which were to prove crucial to the position advanced in the final manuscript which was written relatively quickly in 1852. (9\u201310) It was likely during this period of fermentation that Rosenkranz\u2019s thinking started to diverge with Hegel\u2019s on key issues in the domain of aesthetics. Indeed, the 1835 publication of Hegel\u2019s Aesthetics<\/i>, as edited by H.G. Hotho, may have been a critical factor in the genesis of Rosenkranz\u2019s Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i>. (Rose 2011: 231) Consequently, considering what the former has to say about artistic representations of ugliness, evil, and caricature may offer a sense of some of Rosenkranz\u2019s uniquely divergent views and so motivations for writing his monograph. First, Hegel\u2019s Aesthetics<\/i> as edited by Hotho offers no extensive treatment of ugliness. Consulting its Index reveals sparse mention of the ugly, in more than twelve hundred pages of text, let alone anything resembling a systematic critique and placement of it.<\/p>\n
Second, Hegel\u2019s analysis, as construed by Hotho, is ambivalent as to the aesthetic merit of artworks depicting evil and other \u201crepugnant\u201d moral phenomena. On the one hand, Hegel maintains that depictions of moral crudity are crucial to artistic representations of key motifs of Christian dogma as in, for example, the passion narrative. In the artistic representation of the crucifixion, Hegel tells us, the \u201cinner evil\u201d of the \u201cenemies of Christ\u201d demands \u201con the external side, ugliness, crudity, barbarity, rage\u2026distortion of their outward appearance.\u201d (Eco 2007: 54) On the other hand, elsewhere in the analysis Hegel seems to want to entirely eliminate moral \u201ccrudity\u201d from the domain of aesthetic value. He writes: \u201cevil as such, envy, cowardice, and baseness are and remain purely repugnant\u2026the devil in himself is a bad figure, aesthetically impracticable; for he is nothing but the father of lies and therefore an extremely prosaic person.\u201d (Hegel 1975: 222) Hegel\u2019s ambivalence towards the aesthetic merits of depictions of moral crudity and ugliness in art seems odd and becomes even more so when considered against even a cursory glance at the history of European art: the carnage of Homer, the subaltern of Bosch, the darkness of Novalis, there is no shortage of \u201cenvy, cowardice, and baseness\u201d in its creative catalogue. Nevertheless, the qualification \u201cin himself\u201d in the above quote suggests that Hegel is attempting to marginalize works focusing exclusively on \u201cbaseness,\u201d independent of broader contextualization that would presumably reveal such content as only a moment within a larger whole and so eliminate it as the source of a given work\u2019s aesthetic value. Despite this ambivalence, Hegel does appear to maintain that works that focus excessively on repulsive content such as evil are \u201caesthetically impracticable\u201d and so devoid of aesthetic merit.<\/p>\n
While this might seem like a pedantic consideration of esoteric nuance within Hegel\u2019s position the truth of the matter is that it helps to bring into focus Rosenkranz\u2019s unique position. Rosenkranz first diverges with Hegel in terms of form maintaining that if an artist brings the ethically ugly, i.e. evil, into \u201cvisibility perfectly\u201d then it cannot remain \u201cpurely repugnant\u201d or devoid of aesthetic merit on account of the \u201cperfection\u201d involved in its rendering. (214) Although there is no extensive argument for this claim, it is a key idealist tenant at the foundation of Rosenkranz\u2019s position, distancing him somewhat from Hegel, maintaining that ugliness is of aesthetic value when correctly rendered. Rosenkranz then argues in terms of content or what we might call an aesthetics of realism. In fidelity to the imperfections of the material-social worlds it is the responsibility of the artist to produce works that \u201cmirror\u201d those worlds and not only works that offer \u201cmoral exhibitions\u201d to the audience. (215) He rhetorically asks: \u201cthe representation of the bad\u2026can it not be aesthetically interesting?\u201d (215) The answer, for Rosenkranz, is \u201cyes\u201d and so he would seem to advance the more radical position in that he denies that art must restrict its focus on the basis of morality and instead argues that a commitment to realism entails the artistic representation of the repugnant. Moreover, such realistic works can have aesthetic function and value despite their crudeness of content. Not only does this move challenge our inherited image of Rosenkranz as Hegel\u2019s conservative and conformist apostle, it also further reflects his commitment to broaden and realign German idealism\u2019s aesthetic theory, and so too the parameters of what might qualify as art, in terms of the issue of ugliness which it had traditionally elided.<\/p>\n
Third, Hotho\u2019s Hegel identifies the category of ugliness with caricature in a way that violates the dialectical relation Rosenkranz\u2019s analysis establishes between these categories. For Hegel, artworks involving caricature have to do with the \u201cunnatural\u201d repetition of a characteristic which results in distortion. (Hegel 1975: 18\u201319) Caricature\u2019s \u201cunnatural distortion,\u201d ultimately, is \u201ccharacterizing of the ugly.\u201d (Hegel 1975: 19) Rosenkranz argues, by contrast, that it is through <\/i>caricature\u2019s distortion of a characteristic in a way that is nonetheless true to the subject depicted that ugliness undergoes negation. Rosenkranz, therefore, insists on a subtle difference between the two categories instead of Hegel\u2019s reductive identity of them. The negation undergone by ugliness in caricature, as per dialectical method, reintroduces the ideal of the beautiful and this dissolution functions as the source of \u201cendless mirth,\u201d \u201csmiling and laughter.\u201d (33) Caricature functions as the determinate negation of ugliness and is crucial to Rosenkranz\u2019s orientation of the dialectical process that transpires between beauty and ugliness and so his fundamental difference with Hegel in this regard. Caricature can be read, consequently, as radically emancipatory. (Rose 2011: 237ff.) This move does justice to the satirical and political dimensions of effective caricature which, for Rosenkranz, establishes ugliness as empty in the face of the ideal of beauty which it reaffirms. The subtle interconnection Rosenkranz forges between these categories further substantiates his distinct contribution to aesthetic theory and so his continued relevance for careful reflection on these themes.<\/p>\n
Despite the intrinsic merits of Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i> there are fundamental problems that permeate the investigation. While not irregular for nineteenth century Europe, instances of racism justifiably warrant the reader\u2019s contempt. Concerning the Sans people, on the receiving end of Dutch imperialistic aggression, Rosenkranz writes: \u201ca bushman\u2026whose head is big, whose thigh is thin, whose legs are almost fleshless, wanders already into the apelike mode and thus becomes a caricature of the human form.\u201d (119) While refusing to justify such crudity, Pop\u2019s introductory essay instead contextualizes, correctly noting that such remarks need to be understood to reveal more about Rosenkranz than the subject of such judgments. (Pop 2015: 16\u201317) This is because, according to the very model Rosenkranz espouses, judgments of ugliness are not just formal but depend upon a socially-historically conditioned standard of beauty that the viewer brings to the phenomenon in question. Therefore, such an assessment of the Sans people can only make sense when framed in light of the ideal of beauty that Rosenkranz\u2019s judgment entails, thereby implicating the problematic nature of his<\/i> criteria more than any intrinsic deficiency resident within its target.<\/p>\n
Similarly, Rosenkranz\u2019s analysis of Frankenstein; or the Modern Prometheus <\/i>(1818), written by, as Rosenkranz has it, \u201cShelley\u2019s wife,\u201d i.e. Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, reveals a weak misogyny that also repulses. \u201cShelley\u2019s wife\u201d prompts the question as to what, if anything, her status as \u201cwife\u201d has to do with the structure and content of the narrative and so its problematic status. Rosenkranz\u2019s patronizing endorsement of Shelley\u2019s novel further instantiates this problem. He writes that: \u201cthis confused, femininely overinflated composition has some boldness and depth that makes it attractive.\u201d (211) Rosenkranz goes on to explain, in laboured Hegelian prose, that it is the isolated artificial life that human technology constructs, attempting to rival \u201cthe wondrous act of the Creator,\u201d which constitutes that life\u2019s inherent monstrosity. (211) While the upshot of his point remains valid though pedestrian, the patronizing tone which undergirds it has long warranted the contempt of critical reflection and has left women (and others) to roll their eyes while carefully noting the praxis of ignorant sincerity it betrays.<\/p>\n
Despite these real shortcomings Aesthetics of Ugliness<\/i> nevertheless demands a critical examination of the criteria of beauty, and practices surrounding it, as deployed in modern art and German Idealism\u2019s aesthetic theories, in terms of what it had traditionally excluded<\/i>. It invites questions as to who was excluded, why, and how. Therefore, it makes possible a critical examination of the complex socio-historical processes (economic, political, artistic and philosophical) that were crucial to the exclusion of precise dimensions of the natural and social worlds from so-called serious philosophical reflection as it unfolds within the context of German Idealism\u2019s aesthetics. Anticipating Adorno and Benjamin, it fundamentally concerns itself with the pressing issue of marginalization. This radical gesture, though under-recognized, resides at the core of Rosenkranz\u2019s text and insofar as it might illuminate the history and complex processes involved in the violence of the marginal it remains a valuable resource.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Additional Works Cited<\/b><\/p>\n
Eco, Umberto (2007), On Ugliness<\/i> (tr.) Alastair McEwen (Milan: Rizzoli).<\/p>\n
Hegel, G.W.F. (1975), Hegel\u2019s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, <\/i>vol. 1 (tr.) T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press).<\/p>\n
Rose, Margaret A. (2011), \u201cRosenkranz and \u201cThe Aesthetics of the Ugly,\u201d\u201d in Politics, Religion, and Art: Hegelian Debates,<\/i> ed. Douglas Moggach (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), pp. 231\u2013253.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Karl Rosenkranz, Aesthetics of Ugliness. Translated by Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich. New York: Bloomsbury, 2015; 335 pages. ISBN: 978-1-47256-885-4. Reviewed by Wes Furlotte, Dominican University College\/University of Ottawa Karl Rosenkranz\u2019s \u00c4sthetik des H\u00e4sslichen (1853), translated in 2015 by Andrei Pop and Mechtild Wildrich as Aesthetics of Ugliness, is now available for the first time […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[14,19],"class_list":["post-5810","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reviews","tag-aesthetics","tag-hegel","et-doesnt-have-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"publishpress_future_action":{"enabled":false,"date":"2026-04-22 13:44:50","action":"Draft","newStatus":"draft","terms":[],"taxonomy":"category"},"publishpress_future_workflow_manual_trigger":{"enabledWorkflows":[]},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5810","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5810"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5810\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6932,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5810\/revisions\/6932"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5810"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5810"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/c-scp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5810"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}