Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy
La société canadienne de philosophie continentale

Mount Royal University, Calgary, Alberta, November 15-17

Congress 2018 Programme and Abstracts

Unless otherwise specified, all events will take place on Mount Royal University's campus.

À moins d'indication contraire, tous les événements auront lieu sur le campus de l'Université Mount Royal.

Thursday, November 15

2:00 PM– 3:00 PM	**Coffee and Registration** Room: The Knuckle (EA 3001)
3:00 PM– 5:00 PM	*Plenary Panel* POSTHUMAN METHODS Chair: Morny Joy (University of Calgary) Opening remarks: John Ross King, co-founder of CSCP/SCPC Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) ANNA MUDDE (**CAMPION COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF REGINA**) "CRAFTING ORIENTATIONS: ENCHANTMENTS, ENTANGLEMENTS, EXCERPTS" KYLE KINASCHUK (**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**) WATER, LAMENT, AFTERLIFE: ANTITHESIS AND ANTIPHONY IN MARLENE NOURBESE PHILIP'S *ZONG!* CHRISTINE DAIGLE (**BROCK UNIVERSITY**) "ANTEHUMAN/POSTHUMAN: TRACING THE « POST »"
5:15 PM– 6:15 PM	*Plenary Session:* CATHERINE KELLOGG (**UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA**) "SOVEREIGNTY AND CRUELTY" Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) Chair: Mark Ayyash (Mount Royal University)
6:15 PM– 8:00 PM	**RECEPTION** Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270)

Friday, November 16

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration** Room: The Knuckle (EA 3001)	
9:30 AM– 10:15 AM	NEAL DEROO (KING'S **UNIVERSITY**) " WHY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY OPERATES VIA 'READINGS' OF CANONICAL FIGURES: READING HUSSERL AND MERLEAU-PONTY ON SENSE AND EXPRESSION" Room: EA 1010 Chair: Kyle Kinaschuk (University of Toronto)	CHRISTOPHER COHOON (**UNIVERSITY OF KING'S COLLEGE**) "LEVINAS AND THE ELEMENTAL FEMININE" Room: EA 1018 Chair: Cliff Werier (Mount Royal University)
10:30 AM– 11:15 PM	JACOB SINGER (**DEPAUL UNIVERSITY**) "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY WITHIN HEGEL'S SYSTEM" Room: EA 1010 Chair: Karim Dharamsi (Mount Royal University)	BETTINA BERGO (**UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL**) "BEYOND OBJECT CONSTITUTION, OR: READING LEVINAS WITH GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS" Room: EA 1018 Chair: Steven Engler (Mount Royal University)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session:* SHANNON HOFF (**MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND**) "THE RIGHT AND THE RIGHTEOUS: HEGEL ON CONFESSION, FORGIVENESS, AND THE NECESSARY IMPERFECTION OF POLITICAL ACTION " Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) Chair: Sasa Stankovic (Trent University)	
12:30 PM– 2:30 PM	**Lunch and Business Meeting (all are welcome)** Room: Lincoln Park room (J301)	
2:30 PM– 3:15 PM	DAVID MORRIS (**CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY**) "MELTING TIME: MERLEAU-PONTY, 21ST C PHYSICS, AND TIME AS CONTINGENT NORM OF SENSE" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Gülberk Koc Maclean (Mount Royal University)	DEVIN ZANE SHAW (**DOUGLAS COLLEGE**) "READING RANCIERE'S DISAGREEMENT TODAY: POLITICS, POLICING, AND THE ALT-RIGHT" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Peter Ryan (Mount Royal University)

3:30 PM– 4:15 PM	JAY WORTHY (**UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA**) "INTERVENTION WITHOUT REVOLUTION: MERLEAU-PONTY'S HYPERDIALECTICAL MATERIALISM" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Sinclair MacRae (Mount Royal University)	JEAN-FRANÇOIS HOULE (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "ESTIME DE SOI ET RECONNAISSANCE CHEZ PAUL RICŒUR. LA PETITE ÉTHIQUE COMME ÉTHIQUE DE LA RECONNAISSANCE" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Antoine Eche (Mount Royal University)
4:30 PM– 5:15 PM	DONALD LANDES (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "FOLDINGS OF THE FLESH: TEMPORALITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND PRACTICE IN LATE FOUCAULT, VIA DELEUZE AND MERLEAU-PONTY" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Dianne Chisholm (University of Alberta)	CAITLIN HAMBLIN-YULE (**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**) "MOTIVATIONS FOR POSITING THE OTHER & THE ACCOUNT OF THE COMMUNITY IN FICHTE AND SARTRE" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)
5:30 PM– 6:30 PM	*Plenary Session* *Winner of the 2017 Symposium Book Award* GREG BIRD (**WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY**) "THE DISPOSITIF PROBLEM" Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) Chair: Lorraine Markotic (University of Calgary)	
6:45 PM	**Dinner (on your own)**	

Saturday, November 17

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration** Room: The Knuckle (EA 3001)

9:30 AM– 11:15 AM	*Panel* "AUCUNE APPROCHE N'EST PREMIÈRE À TOUS ÉGARDS": TROIS POINTS D'ENTRÉE DANS SOI-MÊME COMME UN AUTRE DE PAUL RICŒUR" Chair: Emily Hutchison (Mount Royal University) Room: EA 2005 JEAN-FRANÇOIS RIOUX (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "« À LA FOIS PUISSANT ET EFFECTIF » : VERS UNE ONTOLOGIE DU SOI CHEZ PAUL RICŒUR" CASSANDRE BOIS (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "DELIAISON ET LIAISON : LE RAPPORT ENTRE L'IDENTITE NARRATIVE ET L'IPSEITE ETHIQUE CHEZ PAUL RICŒUR" DAPHNÉE SAVOIE (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "LE VOULOIR-VIVRE-ENSEMBLE DANS LA PENSEE POLITIQUE DE RICŒUR"	
10:30 AM– 11:15 AM		SUSAN BREDLAU (**EMORY UNIVERSITY**) "DEMANDING EXISTENCE: DEWEY AND BEAUVOIR ON HABIT, INSTITUTION, AND FREEDOM" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Duncan Maclean (Mount Royal University)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session* SOPHIE-JAN ARRIEN (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE OF PAUL RICOEUR. ON METHOD AND FINITUDE" Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) Chair: Donald Landes (Université Laval)	
12:30 PM– 2:00 PM	**Buffet Lunch Provided** Room: The Knuckle (EA 3001)	
2:00 PM– 2:45 PM	SASA STANKOVIC (**TRENT UNIVERSITY**) "KANT'S DELEUZIAN ETHICS" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Mickey Vallee (Athabasca University)	LAURA MCMAHON (**EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY**) "ON VULNERABILITY AND SECURITY: SYNCRETIC EXPERIENCE, RECOGNITION, AND THE INTERCORPOREAL FORMATION OF SELFHOOD IN MERLEAU-PONTY" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Rob Boschman (Mount Royal University)

3:00 PM– 3:45 PM	CASEY FORD (**INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR**) "THE FUTURE IS THE FRACTURE OF THE PRESENT: TIME AS CRISIS ALREADY IN DELEUZE, MARX, BENJAMIN" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Kenna Olsen (Mount Royal University)	CÉSAR GÓMEZ ALGARRA (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "SUR LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET LA CULPABILITÉ ORIGINAIRES CHEZ DERRIDA" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Marie-Eve Morin (University of Alberta)
4:00 PM- 4:45 PM	LEONARD LAWLOR (**PENN STATE UNIVERSITY**) "'THE PHENOMENON CLOSEST TO THE NOUMENON': ON THE OTHER IN DELEUZE'S DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION" Room: EA 2005 Chair: Anna Mudde (Campion College, University of Regina)	ROBERT TRUMBULL (**SEATTLE UNIVERSITY**) "THE PHANTASM BETWEEN FREUD AND DERRIDA" Room: EA 2007 Chair: Neal DeRoo (King's University)
5:00 PM– 6:00 PM	*Plenary Session* JOHN LYSAKER (**EMORY UNIVERSITY**) "ERROR'S IMPORT" Room: Riddell Library, Visualization Ideas Lounge (EL 1270) Chair: Scott Marratto (Michigan Technological University)	
7:00 PM	**Dinner** Sign up at the registration desk *by noon on Friday* for a Fixed-menu dinner at Winebar Kensington 1131 Kensington Road NW Lower Level Calgary, Alberta T2N 3P4 (cost: $40 per person, plus tax & tip)	

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible: ***Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur appui :***

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Abstracts / Résumés

Arrien, Sophie-Jan (Université Laval), "The philosophical practice of Paul Ricoeur. On method and finitude." This paper addresses the specific way Paul Ricoeur responds to the postmodern deconstruction of notions held since Descartes as essential to any valid philosophizing: reason, objectivity, subject and truth. The most important contribution of Ricoeur, I believe, is to take into account this massive destabilization of philosophy without giving up on its traditional aim to think in an enlightened and rigorous way about human being. I want to suggest that he was able to succeed with this project thanks to a (definitely post-metaphysical) methodological gesture by which the philosopher takes the role of a *phronimos* in the sphere of concepts**.**

Bergo, Bettina (Université de Montréal), "Beyond Object Constitution, or: Reading Levinas with Genetic Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis." In this essay, I argue that Levinas should be read as a radicalizer of Husserl, not as one who violated the letter and spirit of his eidetics. I show how, using the evolution of the concepts of *Einfühlung* (feeling-into, or more deceptively 'empathy') and affective forces, Husserl dug beneath objet constitution and its corresponding intentionalities. I discuss his own interest for pre-cognitive, even non-conscious forces and affects, urging that what Levinas calls "recurrence," "obsession," and "persecution" (*Otherwise than Being*, 86-93) are intensive modalizations of Husserl's more formal affects. In this, I argue that Levinas' later work resembles that of the later Merleau-Ponty, who radicalized perception in its multiple implications. While Merleau-Ponty read *Gestalt* psychology and psychoanalysis 'against the grain', Levinas curiously rewrites certain core intuitions of psychoanalysis without recurring to Freud. He thus resembles the later Husserl, who was fascinated by the possibilities offered by psychoanalysis.

Bird, Greg (Wilfrid Laurier University), "The Dispositive Problem." This presentation focuses on the various issues and problems being raised in contemporary dispositif thinking. I begin with a general discussion of the two primary vectors of the dispositif of the proper, the ontological and political-economy vectors, that I examined in *Containing Community.* For the remainder of the paper, I focus on the two-fold problem that has been raised by key texts in dispositif thinking: the problem of dispositifs and the dispositif problem. First, what really matters for the problem of dispositifs is locating them, figuring out how they operate, and exposing their effects. Dispositifs are neither concepts, nor themes, but *engines* – generators and intellects. Across a now diverse body of texts on dispositifs there is emerging a new type of philosophy, which we might call a "philosophy of engineering." Second, dispositifs materially posit tasks, questions, propositions, in short, problems. After the philosophical engineers have "figured them out," they turn to the issue of addressing what is to be done or, better put, what can be done – the permissible and feasible – with dispositifs. What materially matters for the dispositif problem is finding a way to address the problems they pose. Over the course of my presentation, I shall present various examples of how contemporary philosophers have sought to address this two-fold problematic. I end with a brief discussion of what I feel are some of the more inspiring accounts of how dispositifs can and should be politically addressed.

Bois, Cassandre (Universite Laval), "Déliaison et liaison: le rapport entre l'identité narrative et l'ipséité éthique chez Paul Ricœur." Le déploiement de l'herméneutique du soi dans *Soi-même comme un autre* de Paul Riccœur dépend notamment du passage de la sphère narrative à la sphère éthique par lequel le soi, ayant acquis une permanence dans le temps, devient responsable devant autrui. Or, ce passage de l'identité narrative à l'ipséité éthique, coïncidant avec un enrichissement de l'ipséité, s'avère problématique. Dans cette communication, nous proposons montrer que le lien entre ces deux moments constitutifs de l'ipséité est un rapport de « *déliaison* et *de liaison* ». Nous soutiendrons que cette fragilité de l'articulation entre identité narrative et ipséité éthique est fondée sur la *non-nécessité empirique* de leur rapport, en ce sens que celui-ci est non-conditionnel et non-suffisant. Nous nous appuierons principalement sur les études 6 et 7 de *Soi-même comme un autre*, ainsi que sur certains passages de *Temps et récit III* consacrés à la question.

Bredlau, Susan (Emory University), "Demanding Existence: Dewey and Beauvoir on Habit, Institution, and Freedom." Drawing on John Dewey's discussion of habit in *Human Nature and Conduct* and Simone de Beauvoir's discussion of the "adventurer" in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, I argue that while some of our relations with things and people may very well be instrumental, many take a different form in which it is our very setting, and not merely our attainment, of ends that is at stake. Moreover, the fullest realization of our freedom requires us to recognize not only that this different form of relation, which is cooperative rather than controlling, exists, but also that it is constitutive of, rather than in opposition, to our freedom. I conclude by briefly examining how our honest acknowledgement of the powerlessness inherent to our powers, to our freedom, might change the way we interact with other things and other people.

Cohoon, Christopher (University of King's College), "Levinas and the Elemental Feminine." This paper considers the peculiar relationship between feminine alterity and elemental alterity in Levinas's *Totality and Infinity*. First, I argue that, contrary to what Levinas claims, his descriptions of the genesis of embodied subjectivity imply that elemental alterity is radical and not relative. Next, I argue that the politically and conceptually troubling features of feminine alterity dissipate if we interpret it as a cryptic humanization of elemental alterity that serves to insulate ethics from elemental nature. Finally, I turn briefly to *Otherwise Than Being*, where, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, there arise new ethical possibilities for both elemental nature and the feminine.

Daigle, Christine (Brock University), "Antehuman/Posthuman: Tracing the 'Post.'" In my paper, I will unpack the prefix "post" and question what it refers to. Specifically, I will examine the proposition according to which posthumanism, as a critique and rejection of humanism, is really an antehumanism, namely an attempt to go back to modes of thinking predating humanism's emergence in the Renaissance and consolidation in the Enlightenment. I will trace a genealogy through feminism and other "posts"—poststructuralism and postcolonialism—and demonstrate that as heir of this critical tradition, posthumanism cannot be an antehumanism. Moreover, I will explain that posthumanism offers the critical and generative method we need to overcome antiquated and problematic theorizations that always revert us to the human, all too human.

DeRoo, Neal (The King's University), "Why Continental Philosophy Operates via 'Readings' of Canonical Figures: Reading Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Sense and Expression." This paper explains the provenance of the Continental 'method' of offering readings of canonical figures. It begins by showing how the core project of phenomenology is explicating 'sense' as the connection between the ('objective') world of referents and subjective conceptions or ideas. Expression is the key way sense operates, and failing to adequately understand expression causes Husserl initially to mischaracterize the nature of the relation between subject and world at work in sense. Instead, Merleau-Ponty shows us that the very act of expressing is itself already an expression of a deeper sense that is always already at work as a dynamic *Stiftung* which constitutes us, even as we constitute within it. Reading emerges as a creative and 'productive' method of re-working that *Stiftung*, and so offers us a methodological way of moving the institution (*Stiftung*) of philosophy forward.

Ford Casey (Independent Scholar), "The Future is the Fracture of the Present: Time as Crisis Already in Deleuze, Marx, Benjamin." How should we conceive the future, ontologically and politically? The future is neither a reserve of time to come nor an ideal world promised by the forward movement of history. We thus contest both abstract and linear models of time. This paper presents Gilles Deleuze's theory of temporality to emphasize his claim that the future is not a volume of time outside the present, but rather the movement that both "fractures" the present and causes time to outstrip it.1 We then connect Deleuze's insight with Marx's definition of "communism" as the movement by which the present of capitalist production is disrupted by labor, and not as a utopian society already determined in its structures. Contrary to Schmitt's claim that the "state of exception" belongs uniquely to the power

of sovereignty, we conclude by affirming Benjamin's notion that the crisis of the present is a revolutionary potential intrinsic to time itself.

Gómez Algarra, César (Université Laval), "Sur la responsabilité et la culpabilité." Notre objectif est de mettre à l'épreuve, à partir de la lecture de *Crainte et tremblement* que Derrida soutient dans *Donner la mort*, le problème qui concerne la responsabilité indéterminée avant toute action déterminée. À partir de cette interprétation, Derrida réussit à montrer à quel point le récit d'Abraham constitue notre vérité même. Mais cela ne va pas sans un geste qu'on pourrait nommer « hyperbolique », et qui nous conduit à un problème fondamental : celui de la responsabilité absolue en tant que culpabilité absolue.
Ainsi, il s'agira pour nous d'interroger les possibilités et les limites de la responsabilité/culpabilité absolue en tant que principe ou origine. Notre question directrice est la suivante : dans quelle mesure pouvons-nous parler de la responsabilité absolue comme un principe originaire chez Derrida, et quelle est sa légitimité propre dans une pensée de la déconstruction ?

Hamblin-Yule (University of Toronto), "Motivations for Positing the Other & the Account of the Community in Fichte and Sartre." Recently, there has been interest in the similarities between Fichte and Sartre's view of intersubjectivity and making these comparisons has been helpful in highlighting aspects of both philosopher's systems which otherwise may have been overlooked. There has, however, been little interest in examining the (dis)similarities between their respective motivations for initially positing the Other and the effects the way in which each posited the Other have for their larger projects. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the similarities and dissimilarities we see between Fichte's and Sartre's account of intersubjectivity arise from the way in which they respond to the issue of reflective awareness. I will argue that the way in which they deal with reflective awareness is, in large part, responsible for the differences we see in the way in which they derive the Other and construe the possibility of a community.

Hoff, Shannon (Memorial University of Newfoundland), "The right and the righteous: Hegel on Confession, Forgiveness, and the Necessary Imperfection of Political Action." The focus of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) is the experience of forgiveness, for it is this experience that demonstrates the deepest recognition by an individual—the deepest *enactment*—of our shared humanity. I will interpret Hegel's analysis for the purpose of showing its relevance to contemporary political criticism, using Hegel's analysis of action and judgement to defend a notion of political solidarity against a model of moral righteousness. Hegel argues that moral action will always be a one-sided interpretation of moral principles and hence inherently subject to critical judgment; the honest assessment of such action therefore cannot proceed without an appreciation of its determinate condition. Since this is so, however, communication between agent and critic is the ultimate medium of our moral interaction, and for this interaction to be undertaken authentically, both agent and judge must be open to education and transformation by the perspective of the other. This mutual education is the ultimate meaning of forgiveness, and stands as a permanent challenge to the confident sense of self-satisfaction that commonly presents itself as the voice of moral superiority in our interpersonal and especially political engagements.

Houle, Jean François (Université Laval), "Estime de soi et reconnaissance chez Paul Ricœur. La petite éthique comme éthique de la reconnaissance." Les études sept à neuf de *Soi-même comme un autre,* dans lesquelles Ricœur développe sa « petite éthique » souvent qualifiée d'éthique de la sollicitude, s'achèvent sur une suggestion d'après laquelle la « catégorie de la reconnaissance » exprime adéquatement la « dialectique du même et de l'autre » au cœur de cette éthique. Jean Greisch y a vu « la cellule germinale du Parcours de la reconnaissance » et a qualifié ce

bloc d'études de « premier "travail de reconnaissance" ». Radicalisant ces remarques, nous soutenons que la petite éthique peut être qualifiée d'éthique de la reconnaissance. Nous fournissons à cette thèse une première assise en clarifiant le rapport qu'entretient la notion d'estime de soi – fondamentale dans la petite éthique, où elle est définie comme la capacité d'une personne à évaluer la cohérence de ses actions avec sa conception de la vie bonne, – avec celle de reconnaissance (de soi).

Kellogg, Catherine (University of Alberta), "Sovereignty and Cruelty."

Kinaschuk, Kyle (University of Toronto), "Water, Lament, Afterlife: Antithesis and Antiphony in Marlene NourbeSe Philip's *Zong!*"

Landes, Donald (Université Laval), "Foldings of the Flesh: Temporality, Subjectivity, and Practice in Late Foucault, Via Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty." Foucault's late work is marked by a remarkable turn to the processes of subjectivation and the practices of the self in Greek and Roman culture. In his book on Foucault, Deleuze attempts to make sense of this "turn" by establishing the ontological notion of "foldings" at work in Foucault's understanding of the "self" as the interior created by the foldings of exterior forces. Deleuze attempts to demonstrate a tacit affinity with the phenomenological ontologies of Heidegger and late Merleau-Ponty, but ultimately concludes that Foucault's work remains a radical departure from phenomenology. In this paper, I challenge this reading by returning to early Merleau-Ponty and the importance of embodiment and temporality in the formation of a non-substantial subject. This pathway from Deleuze to Foucault to Merleau-Ponty reveals the importance of a Greek account of ethics for a potential Merleau-Pontian contribution to moral philosophy via an aesthetics of the self.

Lawlor, Leonard (Penn State University), "The Phenomenon Closest to the Noumenon': On the Other in Deleuze's Difference and Repetition." Here, I attempt to explain this phrase as we find it *Difference and Repetition*. The purpose of this explanation lies in trying to understand better Deleuze's relation to phenomenology. The essay therefore examines Deleuze's discussion of intensity in Chapter Five. This analysis of intensity leads up to Deleuze's discussion of alterity at the end of Chapter Five. The other as an expression of a possible world is the noumenon closest to the phenomenon. In particular, the essay shows that the phenomenological idea of analogizing apperception of the other is, for Deleuze, a violation of the other. It treats the other as a developed quality instead of a disparate source of intensity. However, insofar as Deleuze claims that something about the other always remains hidden (the implicated), his description of the experience of others is consistent with the phenomenological insight that the experience of others is always mediated.

Lysaker, John (Emory University), "Error's Import." All philosophical positions seemed destined for error. If that is the case, what else does a philosophical presentation have to offer? I look at exemplification and argue that every text stands as philosophy's representative. I then wonder whether it makes sense to evaluate exemplifications as true and false in the way one is a true friend (or not), or true to oneself (or not). Along the way, I also explore the question of how to think about truth in the context of Habermas, Heidegger, and Rorty (and to a lesser extent, William James, whose view is more robust than Rorty's and offers us a way of moving between Habermas and Heidegger without erasing either).

McMahon, Laura (Eastern Michigan University), "On Vulnerability and Security: Syncretic Experience, Recognition, and the Intercorporeal Formation of Selfhood in Merleau-Ponty." I draw on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to articulate a phenomenological account of selfhood as ambiguously *of* the world and a perspective *on* the world. First, I argue that the self is ontologically vulnerable. Second, I argue that the adult experience of discrete, individual selfhood grows out of a more original "syncretic experience" in early childhood. Third, I engage the work of R. D. Laing and D. W. Winnicott in order to argue that the child's development of a

secure sense of self is inherently bound up with the ways in which she is recognized in the eyes of others. Fourth, I use Merleau-Ponty's discussion of "prosaic" and "flexuous" lines in order to think about different ways in which we can relate to the ambiguous boundaries between self, others, and world. I conclude with some reflections on the dynamic relationship between vulnerability and security in human existence.

Morris, David (Concordia University), "Melting time: Merleau-Ponty, 21st C Physics, and Time as Contingent Norm of Sense." Merleau-Ponty's effort to find a sense, meaning, right within being, leads him to a reconceptualise movement and time. Eventually he comes to conceptualize the movement of nature not as a dislocation within an already determinate space- or time- frame, but as indicating a 'prior' engendering of space and time. But how are we to understand the peculiar temporality of a movement or change 'prior' to time, that engenders time? I first lead this problem out of Merleau-Ponty. I then critically engage physicist Julian Barbour's recent concept of time as *emerging* from dynamics, versus time being a fixed background of dynamics. Barbour's work plunges us into key problems in quantum mechanics, regarding probabilistic and indeterminate being. Altogether, this lets me suggests a concept of time as a contingent phenomenon that would also be a first norm of sense that fits Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the invisible and the visible.

Mudde, Anna (University of Regina), "Crafting Orientations: Enchantments, Entanglements, Excerpts." In this paper, I provide an overview of a new project which takes up a philosophical attunement to craft practices as an ontological method. A lens oriented to craft affirms the importance of paying attention to the ways in which bodies are companions, the ways they become-together, especially in sites that are usually overlooked and undervalued. Against both DIY and DIWY (Without) accounts of craft, in this paper I maintain that craft has always been a practice of DIT: Doing It Together. In part by considering my own engagement with a particular craft, I consider how the enchantment of materials and embodied knowing can lead us to notice transcorporeal entanglements. Such entanglements are best understood not through universalizing discourse, but through localized accounts, beginning with concrete objects and practices. This suggests, I argue, that craft practices require ways of dealing, philosophically, with excerpted, partial, concrete, and local knowledges and objects, and that this grounds the need for robust ontological pluralism.

Rioux, Jean-François (Université Laval), "'A la fois puissant et effectif' : vers une ontologie du soi chez Paul Ricœur." L'ambition de cette présentation est de justifier le recours à Spinoza par Ricœur dans Soi-même comme un autre. Elle prétend y arriver en examinant les raisons pour lesquelles son Éthique constitue un horizon valable pour une ontologie du soi. À chaque fois, il s'agira d'accentuer la manière dont la philosophie de Spinoza répond à chacun des critères posés par Ricœur en vue d'une réappropriation de l'ontologie de l'acte et de la puissance. Dans un premier temps, je qualifierai l'importance de la notion de substance dans l'ontologie spinoziste. Dans un deuxième temps, je montrerai que la spécificité de l'agir humain est préservée dans une ontologie qui semble à première vue la nier. Je conclurai par une question concernant le statut des étants non humains dans la philosophie ricœurienne.

Savoie, Daphnée (Université Laval), "Le vouloir-vivre-ensemble dans la pensée politique de Ricœur." Plus originaire que d'autres fondements sans être fondement absolu, le vouloir-vivre-ensemble occupe un rôle crucial dans la pensée politique de Ricœur. Condition de possibilité de la morale et socle de toute institution, ce souhait de vivre bien ensemble n'a pourtant la réalité que de l'idéalité et ne se concrétise que dans les institutions des hommes. Pour donner à voir ce rôle insigne que Ricœur attribue au vouloir-vivre-ensemble dans la constitution du sens du politique et dans la fondation de l'État, je présenterai dans un premier temps la genèse théorique de l'idée du vouloir-vivre-ensemble, qui procède d'un type plus primitif encore de désir, la simple affirmation joyeuse du pouvoir-être. Dans un deuxième temps, j'explorerai ce que la fragilité et la force constitutives du souhait de vivre ensemble

permettent et requièrent dans le champ de la pratique politique.

Shaw, Devin Zane (Douglas College), "Reading Rancière's Disagreement Today: Politics, Policing, and the Alt-Right" In this talk I revisit Rancière's politics as it is set forth in his landmark book *Disagreement* (1995). I argue that his politics involves a practice of both the symbolization of equality and the subversion or destruction of hierarchical relations of force or command that implement oppressive social relations. By emphasizing how, for Rancière, policing involves force, we will be able to outline the difference between his *political thought* and his *politics of aesthetics*. Then, I will argue that, by emphasizing the way that egalitarian politics combats reified structures of command, coercion, force, or violence, we are able to have done with the spurious objection—raised, for example, by Jodi Dean—that Rancière's politics could be egalitarian just as much as it could be fundamentalist, or worse, fascist. I will argue, by contrast, that the alt-right is by definition a form policing rather than politics.

Singer, Jacob (DePaul University), "The Relationship Between the History and Practice of Philosophy Within Hegel's System." The paper examines the relationship between the history and practice of philosophy within Hegel's system of thought. It argues that neither the history of philosophy, presented in the lectures, nor the pure practice of philosophy, presented in the logic, can be reduce to one another. Rather, each subject is independent, though intimately related in particular ways. Specifically, the pure practice of philosophy serves to delineate the meaning of philosophy, and accordingly what it means to study its history. The history philosophy, in turn, logically follows from, historically preconditions, and experientially verifies the ideas of philosophy presented in the logic. Without delineating these subjects and their relation to one another, both are the mercy of a scepticism that neither one can address on it own.

Stankovic, Sasa (Trent University), "Kant's Deleuzian Ethics." Deleuze thinks that "minor" thought is primarily concerned with the overcoming of judgment in the name of a different relationship to life. "Herein, perhaps lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by defying judgment." The point is not to judge life in the name of values that transcend life, but rather to create within life and to produce values by means of this creation, values which are of life. Contra Deleuze, in this papert I present Kant as a "minor" thinker in this sense. I read Kant's categorical imperative from the perspective of Deleuze's call for an immanent ethics. In order to do that, I focus on Kant's distinctive conception of morality as the actualization of the will. On this interpretation, Kant's famous insistence that reason determine the will does not so much mean that the will lives up to some abstract principle as it means that the will becomes active, that it realizes its inherent capacity to will. It is only as the consequence of this realization, I claim, that the will puts itself into a position to create values.

Trumbull, Robert (Seattle University), "The Phantasm Between Freud and Derrida." The term "phantasm" came to occupy an increasingly central place in Derrida's later work. In *Rogues* and in the late Seminars, he frequently used the term to describe the essentially fictional dimension of the fantasy of mastery at work in the notion of sovereignty: the fantasy that deconstruction contests by showing its untenability. However, while some important work has been done on this concept, we have not yet fully grasped what the "the phantasm" is in Derrida, and this because Derrida's activation of Freud in this theorization has remained underexplored. Looking at the connections between Derrida's conception of the phantasm and the logic of fantasy in Freud, this paper shows that Derrida's rearticulation of Freud in fact effects a significant break with psychoanalysis, such that the dissolution of the phantasm in deconstruction entails *not* grasping the more fundamental ground underlying the fictional fantasy, but rather thinking the absence of ground.

Worthy, Jay (University of Alberta), "Intervention Without Revolution: Merleau-Ponty's Hyperdialectical Materialism." In this paper I outline the notion of a 'hyperdialectical materialism' – a position that follows from Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of the flesh in the *Visible and the Invisible*. I contrast this hyperdialectical approach with the 'synthetic materialism' at stake in the analysis of Marxism that Merleau-Ponty offers in *Humanism and Terror* and *Phenomenology of Perception*. As I argue, the shortcomings of a synthetic dialectics consist in an unavoidably anthropocentric grasp of historical materiality in terms of a 'body proper' that, though evidently alienable, is also from the outset there for us to reappropriate. By contrast, a hyperdialectics avoids this anthropocentrism, while still allowing for meaningful interrogation, critique, and change of given historical-material situations.