Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy
La société canadienne de philosophie continentale

University of King's College, Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 29-October 1

Congress 2016 Programme and Abstracts

All events will take place in the New Academic Building (NAB) and the Arts and Administration Building (AA). The Alumni Hall is on the first floor of NAB; the Frazee and KTS rooms are on the second floor of NAB; the Archibald and Scotiabank rooms are on the third floor of NAB; the Haliburton Room is in AA, on the right upon entrance. A map of the campus can be found on the final page of this programme.

Thursday, September 29

2:00 PM–3:00 PM	**Coffee and Registration**	
3:00 PM–3:45 PM	TRISTANA MARTIN RUBIO (**DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY**) "BODY, WORLD, EVENT: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR ON THE TEMPORALITY OF LIFE" Room: Alumni Hall (NAB 1) Chair: Caleb Langille (University of King's College)	DEVIN ZANE SHAW (**UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA**) "ABENSOUR, LA BOÉTIE, AND THE PROBLEM OF VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE" Room: Frazee (NAB 2) Chair: Aiden Tamasauskas (University of King's College)
4:00 PM–4:45 PM	ALEXANDRA MORRISON (**MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY**) "AGONISTICS: MOUFFE AND BUTLER ON ETHICS AND POLITICS" Room: Alumni Hall (NAB 1) Chair: Christopher Cohoon (University of King's College)	GUILLAUME ST-LAURENT (**UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL**) "LA SOLUTION IMPLICITE DE CHARLES TAYLOR AU PROBLÈME DE L''HISTORICISME TRANSCENDANTAL'" Room: Frazee (NAB 2) Chair: Martine Béland (Collège Édouard-Montpetit)
5:00 PM–6:00 PM	*Plenary Session:* CYNTHIA WILLETT (**EMORY UNIVERSITY**) "THE MUSICOLOGY OF URBAN ETHICS: FLOW AND CALL-RESPONSE FROM FERGUSON TO MEXICO CITY" Room: Alumni Hall (NAB 1) Chair: David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)	
6:00 PM–8:00 PM	**RECEPTION**	

Friday, September 30

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration**	
9:30 AM– 10:15 AM	LAURA MCMAHON (**EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY**) "*EROS* AND *LOGOS*: AN INTERPRETATION OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'THE BODY AS A SEXED BEING'" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Peter Heron (Saint Mary's University)	T. FLOYD WRIGHT (**DEPAUL UNIVERSITY**) "'TAKING THE TRUTH': THE FATE OF THE IMAGINATION IN HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION" Room: Haliburton (AA) Chair: Frederik Hayward (University of King's College)
10:30 AM– 11:15 PM	SUSAN BREDLAU (**EMORY UNIVERSITY**) "LINKING ONE BODY TO ANOTHER: MERLEAU-PONTY ON SEXUAL EXPERIENCE" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Elizabeth Edwards (University of King's College)	TIMOTHY BROWNLEE (**XAVIER UNIVERSITY**) "PARTICULARITY AND THE SELF: A RESPONSE TO ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL" Room: Haliburton (AA) Chair: Sarah Clift (University of King's College)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session* *Winner of the 2013 Symposium Book Award* ANTHONY J. STEINBOCK (**SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE**) "SURPRISE AS EMOTION: BETWEEN STARTLE AND HUMILITY" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Marie-Eve Morin (University of Alberta)	
12:30 PM– 2:15 PM	**Lunch and Business Meeting (all are welcome)**	
2:15 PM– 3:00 PM	DIMITRIS APOSTOLOPOULOS (**UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME**) "FROM SENSE TO LOGIC" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)	JOËL MADORE (**MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND**) "LA FOI DANS LE DOUTE : INTERROGER MARCEL GAUCHET À PARTIR D'IMMANUEL KANT" Room: Frazee (NAB 2) Chair: Marie-Eve Morin (University of Alberta)
3:15 PM– 4:00 PM	MARIE-EVE MORIN (**UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA**) "MERLEAU-PONTY, SPECULATIVE REALISM, AND THE 'OUTSIDE'" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Sarah Clift (University of King's College)	TIMOTHY JUSSAUME (**SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY**) "WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHICAL HERMENEUTICS OF THE WILL" Room: Frazee (NAB 2) Chair: Katy Weatherly (University of King's College)

4:15 PM– 5:00 PM	JOHN RUSSON (**UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH**) "PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Ben Koonar (University of King's College)	MARTINA FERRARI (**UNIVERSITY OF OREGON**) *Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize* "*AN-ARCHIC* PAST: RETHINKING NEGATIVITY WITH BERGSON" Room: Frazee (NAB 2) Chair: Michael J. Bennett (University of King's College)
5 :15 PM– 6 :15 PM	*Plenary Session* EVA-MARIA SIMMS (**DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY**) "GESTALT AND DIFFERENCE – MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY BEYOND SUBSTANCE AND SUBJECTIVITY" Room: KTS (NAB 2) Chair: Shannon Hoff (Memorial University of Newfoundland)	

Saturday, October 1

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration**	
9:30 AM– 10:15 AM	CHRISTINE WIESELER (**MCGOVERN CENTER FOR ETHICS AND HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER-HOUSTON**) "MATERIAL ANONYMITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF MERLEAU-PONTY AND SOME OF HIS SUCCESSORS" Room: Archibald (NAB 3) Chair: Anthony Fernandez (Dalhousie University)	SUSANNA LINDBERG (**UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE**) "ONTO_TECHNO_LOGY" Room: Scotiabank (NAB 3) Chair: Robert Pantalone (Acadia University)
10:30 AM– 11:15 AM	RANDALL JOHNSON (**PSYCHIATRY, PRIVATE PRACTICE**) "IN THE LAST INSTANCE—RADICAL NON-PHILOSOPHY: MARX AND MERLEAU-PONTY" Room: Archibald (NAB 3) Chair: Lauren Hooper (Acadia University)	KAREN ROBERTSON (**TRENT UNIVERSITY**) "HEIDEGGER ON THE AMBIVALENT STATUS OF HUMAN INTERPRETATION: ART, HISTORY, MODERNITY" Room: Scotiabank (NAB 3) Chair: Peter Heron (Saint Mary's University)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session* IAIN MACDONALD (**UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL**) "ONTOLOGY AND DIALECTIC: PERSPECTIVES ON POSSIBILITY IN ADORNO AND HEIDEGGER" Room: Archibald (NAB 3) Chair: Martine Béland (Collège Édouard-Montpetit)	

12:30 PM– 2:15 PM	**Lunch (on your own)**	
2:15 PM– 3:00 PM	SEAN MCGRATH (**MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND**) "THE LOGIC OF LOVE IN THE LATER SCHELLING" Room: Archibald (NAB 3) Chair: Hannah Medley (University of King's College)	MICHAEL BLEZY (**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**) "REALITY AND THE REAL: HEIDEGGER'S APPROPRIATION OF KANT" Room: Scotiabank (NAB 3) Chair: Andrew Griffin (University of King's College)
3:15 PM– 4:45 PM	*Plenary Panel* "PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF EXPRESSION" Chair: Daniel Brandes (University of King's College) Room: Archibald (NAB 3) JEFF MORRISEY (Southern Illinois University - Carbondale, formerly University of King's College) "EXPERIENCE AND EXPRESSION IN FICHTE AND MERLEAU-PONTY" KYM MACLAREN (Ryerson University, formerly University of King's College) "AGENCY, OPPRESSION, AND THE RETROSPECTIVE LOGIC OF EXPRESSION" SCOTT MARRATTO (Michigan Technological University, formerly University of King's College) "'TECHNIQUES OF THE BODY': SUBJECTIVITY AND SELF-PORTRAITURE"	
5:00 PM– 6:00 PM	*Plenary Session* GRAEME NICHOLSON (**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**) "WHY IS CONCEALMENT ESSENTIAL TO TRUTH?" Room: Archibald (NAB 3) Chair: Scott Marratto (Michigan Technological University)	
7:00 PM	**Dinner** Sign up at the registration desk *by noon on Friday* for a banquet at The Five Fishermen, 1740 Argyle Street. Participants pay their own way (but the Society will cover main courses for graduate student presenters).	

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible: ***Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur appui :***

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Abstracts / Résumés

Dimitris Apostolopoulos (University of Notre Dame), "From Sense to Logic." While the relationship between sense and language occupied Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite throughout their philosophical careers, their respective projects have been thought to offer different accounts of both sense and language. Despite their differences, I argue that Hyppolite and Merleau-Ponty converge on a solution to a shared problem: how to develop a philosophical language that is neither aesthetic nor formal. Having put the problem of sense at the centre of his interpretation of Hegel, whose importance he was alerted to by Merleau-Ponty, Hyppolite argues that a mediating language can state the sense of being without becoming a human construction. Similarly, mediation lies at the heart of Merleau-Ponty's account of ontological language, which is neither human creation nor pure description of being. On this reading, Hyppolite's 'anti-humanism', and his purported transcending of phenomenology for ontology, must be qualified, allowing for a philosophical *rapprochement* with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.

Michael Blezy (University of Toronto), "Reality and the Real: Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant." The following essay addresses a complication that arises from the tight connection established by Heidegger in *Being and Time* between Dasein and its world: if Dasein disappears, does this mean that the world also disappears? And what kind of objective reality is to be ascribed to a world that depends on the human beings inhabiting it? By showing that Heidegger appropriates a kind of Kantian position regarding the transcendental stance, I will argue that Heidegger can coherently maintain that Dasein's understanding of being - not the entities that make up the world - will cease to exist when Dasein disappears. Along the way, I give a close reading of Heideggerian "phenomena," as well as weigh on the Carmen/Blattner debate regarding the extent to which entities "are" independent of Dasein.

Susan Bredlau (Emory University), "Linking One Body to Another: Merleau-Ponty on Sexual Experience." I argue that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of sexuality in Part One, Chapter Five of the *Phenomenology of Perception* reveals that understanding sexual desire properly requires us to look at "humans beings from the outside" ("Man Seen From the Outside," 83). That is, rather than turning inward and approaching sexual desire as a kind of mental event we ought, instead, to turn outward and approach sexual desire as a certain way that other people can appear to us. I begin by focusing on Merleau-Ponty's conception of sexual desire as an embodied intentionality that grasps other bodies as subjects. Next, I explore the specific form of recognition that is enacted by our bodies as attracted and attractive to other bodies. Finally, I discuss our unique vulnerability in sexual desire. Our bodies cannot insure that other bodies will reciprocate our attraction to them, and any attempt to insure such reciprocation will render it impossible. If mutual attraction is to be possible, then, we must seek to honestly acknowledge the vulnerability of embodied subjectivity.

Timothy Brownlee (Xavier University), "Particularity and the Self: A Response to Adorno's Critique of Hegel." In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno argues that Hegel falsely holds that grasping the concept of particularity entails a grasp of particulars, and that this is a problem because Hegel neglects the element of "non-identity" in particulars that eludes the grasp of "identity" thinking. I draw on Hegel's account of "the self" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to argue that Hegel defends a conception of the self—that of the "moral" self, which Hegel calls "conscience"—according to which particularity is essential to its constitution. I show that, for Hegel, the act of claim-making is essential to this moral conception of the self, and that acknowledging this role of the specific, concrete claims that we make on one another provides the basis both for a response to Adorno's critique, and a challenge to recent interpreters who stress the role of the "ethical" (*das Sittliche*) in Hegel's conception of practical reason.

Martina Ferrari (University of Oregon), "*An-Archic* Past: Rethinking Negativity with Bergson." Thanks to the revival in Bergson's scholarship prompted by Gilles Deleuze's *Bergsonism* (1988), it is widely recognized that Bergsonism, as Leonard Lawlor puts it, "is a philosophy of the unconscious" that fundamentally challenges the metaphysics of presence. Less attention, however, has been devoted to the status of negation or negativity in Bergson's thought. Finding in Bergson a valid alternative to Hegelianism, Deleuze famously claims that "the heart of Bergson's project is to think differences in kind independently of all forms of negation: there are differences in being yet nothing negative." Contra Deleuze, I argue that Bergson's claim that memory and perception, past and present,

differ in *kind* does not call for the erasure of the negative, but, rather, for the radical reconceptualization of negation in *temporal* terms. Thinking negation *temporally* allows Bergson to open the space for conceptualizing existence beyond presence, for developing an account of the paradoxical nature of the past. With an insight that anticipates Derrida's thinking, Bergson tells us that the past is neither "there" nor "not-there," neither a presence nor an absence.

Randall Johnson (Psychiatry, private practice), "In the last instance—radical non-philosophy: Marx and Merleau-Ponty." As a phrase that bridges the liminality between revolutionary praxis and the abstractions of theory, in the last instance marks the dialectical point at which non-philosophy risks reinscribing itself into a philosophy that congeals into negativism or positivism. We will employ this phrase, somewhat as a trope, to sketch the critical production of two fictive Merleau-Pontys: the apolitical thinker and the liberal humanist. These two figures hauntingly persist in readings of Merleau-Ponty and remain in need of ongoing critique. While he does not remain a Marxist in the sense that Marxism became identified with communism, we will claim that he remains a Marxian in the sense of being a consistent and critical thinker of Marx. After briefly tracing his connection with Soviet era communism and the rupture with Sartre, we will conclude with a look at his last courses in which Merleau-Ponty thinks towards a radical non-philosophy.

Timothy Jussaume (Saint Leo University), "Wittgenstein's Ethical Hermeneutics of the Will." My paper argues that both ethics and logic function as conditions of possibility for the world of states of affairs, i.e., the factual content of the world is always already structured in advance by ethics and logic. This will require, however, that we also take seriously Wittgenstein's opening remarks in the preface regarding the limits of thought. In what follows, I argue that ethics is both *thinkable* and *nonsensical*, since it is not itself a state of affairs, but rather is a transcendental condition of possibility for the world of states of affairs. If so, this will confirm Wittgenstein's clear Kantian inheritance (viz., transcendental subjectivity), as well as his debt to Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will. And, more importantly, it will show that the *Tractatus* depends upon an implicit metaphysics in which what is *unsaid* is just as important as what is *said*.

Susanna Lindberg (University of Tampere), "Onto-Techno-Logy." This is an original hypothesis concerning the possibility of using the phenomenon of technology in order to solve a conflict in contemporary continental ontology between speculative materialism and (post)phenomenological approaches. The hypothesis is that today, technology gives a priviledged access to ontology, because 1. it leads to a "materialist" ontology, avoiding both theological and nihilistical approaches and 2. the artificiality of technology prevents its explication in terms of any naturalist materialism. The argument starts by a critical examination of two techno-ontologies that come from speculative realism: Levi R. Bryant's *Onto-cartography. An Ontology of Machines and Media* and Graham Harman's tool-being (that he develops since *Tool-Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects*). A counterargument is presented through Jean-Luc Nancy's idea of "eco-technics". In conclusion, the usefulness of the figure of technology for ontology is evaluated, and preference is given to a postphenomenological approach.

Iain Macdonald (Université de Montréal), "Ontology and Dialectic: Perspectives on Possibility in Adorno and Heidegger." The relevance of Adorno's critique of Heidegger might (to some) seem to be reflected and confirmed in recent developments in our understanding of Heidegger's commitment to National Socialism and to conservative revolutionary ideas more generally. Indeed, some might even say that the end is finally in sight in the seemingly interminable debate regarding Heidegger's value as a philosopher insofar as it is now affirmed that he was never really a philosopher but merely a spokesman for Nazism and anti-Semitism. However, while Adorno certainly thought that Heidegger's thought was "fascist to its innermost cells," it is perhaps worth underscoring that the core of his critique is utterly philosophical. Yet certain aspects of Adorno's critique remain obscure, in part because it has so many facets and in part because it does not follow a very linear course in its unfolding. This paper will attempt to sort through the most central aspects of Adorno's critique of Heidegger while focusing on a more or less hidden organizing principle that drives it forward: their superficially very similar, and yet, in the end, fundamentally very different notions of possibility.

Kym Maclaren (Ryerson University), "Agency, Oppression, and the Retrospective Logic of Expression."

Joël Madore (Memorial University of Newfoundland), « La foi dans le doute : Interroger Marcel Gauchet à partir d'Immanuel Kant. » Dans son opus magnum, *Le désenchantement du monde* (1985), Marcel Gauchet soutient que la religion, en tant que principe anthropologique structurant notre compréhension de l'univers, s'est épuisée. Accéléré par le christianisme, ce virage vers l'autonomie inclut dans son sillage la foi, qui se déplace de l'espace de la

communauté vers l'intériorité. Croire, dans ce cas, n'est rien de moins qu'un « sentiment » contingent, nous dit Gauchet, qui viendrait adoucir les tourments existentiels d'une mort inévitable. Ce texte souhaite interroger ce verdict, du moins en partie. Plutôt que d'interdire la foi, l'effacement de la religion lui en ouvrirait la voie. La foi n'est pas le procédé par lequel la logique divine est confirmée; elle est ce qui émerge de ses fractures. Espoir devant l'inconnu, la foi suppose l'abandon d'un sujet laissé à lui-même dans un monde sans Dieu; elle s'élance dès lors que l'idée d'une mécanique du monde vacille.

Scott Marratto (Michigan Technological University) "'Techniques of the Body': Subjectivity and Self-Portraiture."

Sean Mcgrath (Memorial University of Newfoundland), "The Logic of Love in the Later Schelling." While history exhibits no logical process according to Schelling, it does, however, manifest meaning. In a loose sense, we can speak of a *logic* of creation and redemption in the later Schelling; we will call it the logic of love. For the reason *why* God decides for difference rather than indifference, for many things rather than the one—why he creates something rather than nothing—is that love might be. The later Schelling's logic of love is constructed as an alternative to Hegel's determinism by the concept or what we might call Hegel's rationalism. The Hegelian notion of the absolute as self-mediation struck Schelling as indefensible, and its related figure, the dialectic of recognition, a poor substitute for love. The lovers in question in Schelling's logic of love are God and the world, but what is said of them applies *mutandis mutandi* to self and other. We can in fact read Schelling's 1809 *Freedom* essay as an alternative to Hegel's reflective model of relationship, the well known and influential figure of the master and slave dialectic in which love is recognition of oneself in and by the other. Love for Schelling is not recognition but freely willing a new self: love is the willing of one who precedes the relationship and is therefore free from the other, but who wills to be now and henceforth one who does not exist and cannot exist without the other.

Laura McMahon (Eastern Michigan University), "*Eros* and *Logos*: An Interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's 'The Body as a Sexed Being.'" This paper offers an interpretation of the chapter of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* entitled "The Body as a Sexed Being." First, I argue that in the background of Merleau-Ponty's account of the nature of human existence is an existentialist interpretation of an Aristotelian view of what is distinct about the human animal, arguing that *logos* expresses itself "all the way down" in human existence and bodily life. Second, I explore the nature of specifically emotional and desirous intentionality. Third, I argue that it is in the domain of erotic life that we have one of the most powerful opportunities to "become" ourselves as individuals. Fourth, I explore the manners in which problems within our emotional, erotic existences are expressed in the lived body itself, as well as in the world of perception that the lived body projects around itself.

Marie-Eve Morin (University of Alberta), "Speculative Realism, and the 'Outside.'" My primary aim in this paper is to show that it is by going *through* phenomenology, rather than completely side-stepping it, that we can gain the understanding of "the outside" that is demanded both by the new realist movement and by our times. My hypothesis is that by tracing the trajectory of Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy out of a certain phenomenology, we can pinpoint the problems with any phenomenology that would assert the absolute nature of the intentional relation, what Meillassoux labelled "strong correlationism." Any such phenomenology, so Meillassoux, can only explain the resistance of the perceived to the meaning it acquires in my interaction with it by appealing to the finitude of my access. This is the thrust of the speculative realist challenge: it forces phenomenology to think through its inability to think an outside that is not already a kind of inside. Yet, I show that Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy offers us a kind of radical outside akin to Meillassoux's "hyperchaos" or Harman's "inner life of objects," but whereas speculative realism maintains the integrity of this outside only by severing it from the world of experience, Merleau-Ponty diagnoses such detachment as *pensée de survol* and proposes instead to think the relation between inside and outside through the dimension of depth or latency.

Jeff Morrisey (Southern Illinois University – Carbondale), "Experience and Expression in Fichte and Merleau-Ponty."

Alexandra Morrison (Michigan Technological University), "Agonistics: Mouffe and Butler on Ethics and Politics." Feminist philosophers Judith Butler and Chantal Mouffe both challenge liberal conceptions of politics that rely upon concepts of contract, negotiated consensus, and communicative action. *Nevertheless*, Butler's work, clearly echoing Heidegger, emphasizes the ethical—her thinking of the ethical is summed up in the notion of "an ethics of anxiety"—whereas Mouffe emphasizes the political—the concept of "hegemony"—the idea that identities are instituted in the context of political conflict. I argue that these two approaches are necessary supplements for each other, but that

Butler's approach is a more rigorous challenge to the logic of neoliberalism because it offers a more compelling account of how identities come to be formed within the field of the political.

Graeme Nicholson (University of Toronto), "Why is Concealment Essential to Truth?" Heidegger argues that, in its essence, truth includes concealment and other forms of untruth. I shall try to defend this idea and show some consequences of it, e. g., that everything that is true must be concealing something. A few examples will show that this is neither a negative nor a skeptical doctrine. (This paper is an extract from the forthcoming book *The Fate of Aletheia: Heidegger on the Essence of Truth*.)

Karen Robertson (Trent University), "Heidegger on the Ambivalent Status of Human Interpretation: Art, History, Modernity." Drawing on Heidegger's essay "The Origin on the Work of Art," I argue that Heidegger's account of art demonstrates that art reveals human experience to be simultaneously familiar and concrete, on the one hand, and ecstatic and interpretive, on the other hand, and that art is part of the very way our experience unfolds. Second, I argue that the dynamic of experience that art enables and in which it is implicated is precisely what historical experience is. Next, I turn to "Why Poets?" to analyse Heidegger's ambivalent critique of Rilke's work in terms of the idea that art is involved in our self-constitution as historical beings. Reading these two essays together, finally, allows me to conclude by characterising the demands of a distinctly modern experience of interpretation, one defined in terms of the possibilities of difference and cooperation that characterize modern endeavours.

Tristana Martin Rubio (Duquesne University), "Body, World, Event: Simone de Beauvoir on the Temporality of Life." Through an engagement with Simone de Beauvoir's *The Coming of Age* this paper argues that while the body ages in and is transformed through time, aging and "old age" cannot be simply explained from the perspective of a temporal becoming of linear progression but must rather be must be related to the temporality of the event. I explore this temporality in two ways: first, through an account of the *event of old age* as a radical perceptual shift in the sense of the whole of one's existence. Second, I offer an account of *aging as event* which refers to a transition with regard to a radical reconfiguration of a totality of possibilities for life. It is in embodied life that one finds oneself transforming and it is in the radical discovery of oneself as already transformed that marks, for de Beauvoir, the coming of age.

John Russon (University of Guelph), "Phenomenological Method and Artistic Expression." In order to understand the nature of phenomenology, I study the "phenomenon" and the "logos" of phenomenology. I argue first that it is not introspection but such empirical sciences as history and psychology that reveal the phenomenon of experience, and they precisely reveal it not to be the representational consciousness of the solipsistic individual, but to be a collectively enacted engagement with the world. I argue second that description is a form of expression and that the act of expression is not separable from the object expressed, that is, the act of expressing itself enacts a revolutionary transformation within the form of experience itself. For this reason, the act of phenomenological description itself depends upon acts of artistic expression. I conclude that phenomenological description itself is a transformative activity in which the recognition of the form of experience itself enacts a transformation within experience.

Devin Zane Shaw (University of Ottawa), "Abensour, La Boétie, and the Problem of Voluntary Servitude." In this talk, I examine and situate Miguel Abensour's recent work on La Boétie's concept of voluntary servitude. While it seems that the concept of voluntary servitude would produce recrimination against those who are oppressed by maintaining that the oppressed desire their own oppression, Abensour's wager concerning voluntary servitude draws an entirely different consequence: by undermining the prejudice that the oppressed are those who are incapable of acting, La Boétie opens the possibility of thinking emancipatory politics as the politics of self-emancipation. This wager requires a radical reinterpretation of La Boétie's *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude*. I outline this reading while suggesting differences between Abensour and the customary—linear and univocal—reading of the *Discourse*, Clastres' anthropological interpretation, and Lefort's linguistic interpretation.

Eva-Maria Simms (Duquesne University), "Gestalt and Difference – Merleau-Ponty's philosophical anthropology beyond substance and subjectivity." French philosophy in the 60's declared the end of philosophical anthropology. However, philosophical anthropologies still operate in psychological theories and practices without being noticed as such. How we think about human beings in relation to other humans and nature has consequences for the praxis of the social sciences: it provides the framework for the ethical relationships between people and with the larger natural world. The challenge today is to develop *better* philosophical anthropologies that are non-hierarchical, non-sexist, non-racist; they have to create room for difference, account for the human as part of an ecological field, allow for an understanding of language, culture, and history, and give human agency and ethics a place. Merleau-Ponty's late

work fulfills these requirements and provides the guidelines for a phenomenological anthropology that is no longer based on subjectivity and substance. This paper traces some of Merleau-Ponty's ideas that are key elements of a post-subjectivistic philosophical anthropology: perceptual faith and knowledge, meaning and substance, gestalt and transcendence, and chiasm and subjectivity.

Anthony J. Steinbock (Southern Illinois University-Carbondale), "Surprise as Emotion: Between Startle and Humility." I consider the experience of surprise within the context of my current work on the emotions. To do this, I examine surprise in terms of its belief structure, distinguishing it from a startle (1). I then suggest that surprise is a being caught off-guard that is related to being attentively turned toward something (2). As the latter, I qualify surprise as an emotion in its being thrown back on an experience in a way that is different from affectively turning toward something (3). This constitutes surprise as a disequilibrium in distinction to a diremptive experience like we find in the moral emotions of shame or guilt (4). Finally, I distinguish surprise from a gift, which is peculiar to the experience of humility. I then suggest that surprise is an emotion while being neither an affect, like a startle-reflex, nor a moral emotion, like shame, guilt, or humility (5).

Guillaume St-Laurent (Université de Montréal), » La solution implicite de Charles Taylor au problème de l' ‹ historicisme transcendantal. › » Notre objectif est de montrer que la théorie de l'argumentation philosophique développée par Charles Taylor peut être comprise comme une solution implicite au problème de l'« historicisme transcendantal », qui consiste dans le cadre de la tradition herméneutique contemporaine à ériger l'historicité de la compréhension en principe universel, parce qu'inéluctable. Cette solution réside dans ce que nous caractérisons comme la double faillibilité « ontologique » et « herméneutique » de l'argumentation transcendantale, et tout particulièrement dans le fait que celle-ci se déploie comme une opération *stratifiée*, qui prend son départ de conditions minimales et « évidentes en soi » pour ensuite s'enrichir et se complexifier progressivement.

Christine Wieseler (McGovern Center for Ethics and Humanities, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston), "Material Anonymity and Phenomenology: A Critique of Merleau-Ponty and Some of his Successors." I use Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's notion of material anonymity, which obtains when there is an adequate fit between a body and its social and physical environment, in order to clarify how the assumptions of Merleau-Ponty and several of his successors limit the applicability of their approaches. Perspectives arising from the starting point of disabled people's lived experiences add to the trenchant critiques of Merleau-Ponty that feminist philosophers and philosophers of race, such as George Yancy, have developed. Material anonymity clarifies his tacit assumptions and ties these critiques together. The type of embodied experience he takes to be standard is actually one that only a privileged few consistently have. Phenomenologists need to account for the impact of bodily particularities and the ways that norms related to disability, race, and gender structure one's being in the world.

Cynthia Willett (Emory University), "The Musicology of Urban Ethics: Flow and Call-Response from Ferguson to Mexico City." From Ferguson, Missouri to Mexico City political demands move hand in hand with cultural movements reflecting aspects of what art critics since the 1990s have called relational aesthetics. Contesting the value of the museum artifact as well as the autonomous self, these movements produce art as acts of collaboration with social goals. What rappers term flow and call-response constitute the corporeal and affect-driven ethico-aesthetic dynamics of urban lives across the US/Mexican border. Creative practices in multimedia art, rap, and popular music counter the negative charges and territorial markings of the geopolitical map drawn by the American drug wars with the rhythms and tones of change.

Thomas Wright (DePaul University), "'Taking the Truth': The Fate of the Imagination in Hegel's Critique of Schleiermacher's Concept of Religion." Hegel's reputation as an inveterate rationalist sometimes pits him against the Romantics, who are credited with revitalizing the role of the imagination in philosophy. This opposition seems especially pointed in his debate with his colleague at the University of Berlin, Friedrich Schleiermacher, who famously claimed that a rational system of moral principles was not only superfluous to the essence of religion, it was in conflict with it, because religion is rooted above all in individual feeling. In contrast, Hegel is widely known for the thesis that the content of religion and philosophy are identical, and thus that everything that can be known about God—the absolute—is known rationally. This essay complicates the typical interpretation by showing that Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher's "theology of feeling" is not rooted in rational principles, but the irremediably social dimension of moral judgment, in which imagination plays an integral rather than a derivative role.

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