Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy
La société canadienne de philosophie continentale

Bishop's University, Lennoxville, Quebec, September 26-28

Congress 2019 Programme and Abstracts

Unless otherwise specified, all events will take place in the Cleghorn Room, McGreer Hall.
À moins d'indication contraire, tous les événements auront lieu au Cleghorn Room, McGreer Hall.

Thursday, September 26

2:00 PM– 3:00 PM	**Coffee and Registration** Cleghorn Room	
3:00 PM– 3:45 PM	DYLAN SHAUL (**VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY**) "ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL: MELANCHOLIA CONTRA MOURNING" Room: Nicolls 004 Chair: David Morris (Concordia University)	DAVE GUIGNION (**UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO**) " SOFTWARE AND THE SIMULACRUM" Room: Hamilton 301 Chair: Don Dombowsky (Bishop's University)
4:00 PM– 4:45 PM	GABRIEL TOUPIN **(UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL)** LA BILDUNG COMME PHARMAKON : UNE LECTURE ADORNIENNE DU CONCEPT DE CULTURE CHEZ HEGEL" Room: Nicolls 004 Chair: Florence-Olivia Genesse (Johns Hopkins University)	ALLEN PORTER (**RICE UNIVERSITY**) "A SUPPLEMENT FOR HÄGGLUND'S DEFLATIONARY READING OF DECONSTRUCTION" Room : Hamilton 301 Chair: Aaron Hone (Bishop's University)
5:00 PM– 6:45 PM	**RECEPTION** Room: Cleghorn Room	
7:00 PM– 8:30 PM	*Plenary Session:* IN CONVERSATION WITH CHARLES TAYLOR (**MCGILL UNIVERSITY**) Room: Centennial Theatre Chair: Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University)	

Friday, September 27

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration** Cleghorn Room	
9:30 AM– 10:15 AM	IAIN MACDONALD (**UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL**) "AVALANCHES II: ON RUBEN ÖSTLUND'S 'FORCE MAJEURE'" Room: McGreer 100 Chair: Don Dombowsky (Bishop's University)	PHILLIPPE THEOPHANIDIS (**YORK UNIVERSITY**) "GILBERT SIMONDON ET LE SUNOLON : UNE CONTRIBUTION À LA QUESTION DE L'ÊTRE" Room: Nicolls 213 Chair: Guillaume Boucher (Concordia University)
10:30 AM– 11:15 PM	JULIEN RUEFF (**UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL**) "D'UN INSTRUMENT DE CONNAISSANCE À UN «MOYEN DE TENIR EN LAISSE ». CRITIQUE ADORNIENNE DE LA CRITIQUE MARXISTE DE L'IDÉOLOGIE" Room: McGreer 100 Chair: Guillaume Boucher (Concordia University)	DAVID MORRIS (**CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY**) "THE TRANSCENDTALITY OF PASSIVITY, AND THE CONTINGENCY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS INSTITUTION" Room: Nicolls 213 Chair: Jamie Crooks (Bishop's University University)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session* MARIANA LARISON (**CONICET, BUENOS AIRES**) "ESQUISSE D'UNE PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE DE L'INSTITUTION : VERS UNE TRANSTEMPORALITÉ ORIGINAIRE" Room: McGreer 100 Chair: Donald Landes (Université Laval)	
12:30 PM– 2:30 PM	**Lunch and Business Meeting (all are welcome)** Room: Cleghorn Room	
2:30 PM– 3:15 PM	CASEY FORD (**UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH**) "THE WORLD AS A SCENE OF RISK: LEARNING IN DEWEY AND DELEUZE" Room: Nicolls 004 Chair: Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University)	AMIE ZIMMER (**UNIVERSITY OF OREGON**) "REDRESSING THE FEMININE: REMEDYING LEVINAS' METAPHYSICS OF SHAME" Room: Nicolls 109 Chair: Marie-Emmanuelle Genesse (Bishop's University)
3:30 PM– 5:30 PM	*Plenary Panel* "ETERNITY, TEMPORALITY, PRIORITY: ON THEMES IN NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, AND LEVINAS" Chair: David Morris (Concordia University) Cleghorn Room DON DOMBOWSKY	

	(**Bishop's University**) "Symbolic Insurrection: Eternal Recurrence as an Instrument of Appropriation" Jamie Crooks (**Bishop's University**) "The Temporality of Counterpoint: Notes on Heidegger and Bach" Bruce Gilbert (**Bishop's University**) "Levinas and the Good"
5:30 PM	**Dinner (on your own)**

Saturday, September 28

9:00 AM– 9:30 AM	**Coffee and Registration** Cleghorn Room	
9:30 AM– 10:15 AM	Alexandra Morrison (**Michigan Technological University**) "The Politics of Anxiety: Precarity and Disorientation in Butler and Ahmed" Room Nicolls 004 Chair: Guillaume Boucher (Concordia University)	Adam Blair (**Stony Brook University**) "Phenomenologist as Artist, Artist as Phenomenologist: The Aesthetic Encounter in Merleau-Ponty" Room Hamilton 301 Chair: Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University)
10:30 AM– 11:15 AM	Hannah LeGrand (**McMaster University**) *Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize* "The Importance of the Private in Hannah Arendt" Room Nicolls 004 Chair: Scott Marratto, CSCP President (Michigan Technological University)	Susan Bredlau (**Emory University**) "Losing One's Voice: Merleau-Ponty and the Lived Space of Conversation" Room Hamilton 301 Chair: Jamie Crooks (Bishop's University)
11:30 AM– 12:30 PM	*Plenary Session* Leonard Lawlor (**Pennsylvania State University**) "The Gift of Time: The Question of the Death Penalty in Derrida" Room: McGreer 100 Chair: Scott Marratto (Michigan Technological University)	
12:30 PM– 2:15 PM	**Lunch (on your own)**	

2:30 PM–3:15 PM	MAX SCHAEFER (**UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK**) "MICHEL HENRY'S (NON)POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE " Room: Nicolls 004 Chair: Aaron Hone (Bishop's University)	MARIE-HÉLÈNE DESMEULES (**THE NEW SCHOOL OF SOCIAL RESEARCH**) "A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CONSENT" Room: Hamilton 301 Chair: Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University)
3:30 PM–4:15 PM	CAPUCINE MERCIER (**UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL**) "CORPS ET SUJETS : QUELLES RÉSISTANCES? LE POUVOIR PRODUCTIF CHEZ FOUCAULT" Room: Nicolls 004 Chair: Guillaume Boucher (Bishop's University)	LAURA MCMAHON (**EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY**) "PALIMPSESTIC TRANSFORMATIONS: RELIGION, MULTICULTURALISM, AND PHENOMENOLOGY AS A CRITICAL PRACTICE" Room: Hamilton 301 Chair: Duncan Alderdice (University)
4:30 PM–5:30 PM	*Plenary Session* *Winner of the 2018 Symposium Book Award* PENELOPE DEUTSCHER (**NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY**) "BETWEEN THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE: THE LIMITS OF "LIFE DEATH" AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE" Room: Cleghorn Room Chair: Scott Marratto (Michigan Technological University)	
7:00 PM	**Dinner** Sign up at the registration desk *by noon on Friday* for a common meal at Shalimar Restaurant, address 263 Queen Street, Sherbrooke, QC Cost $29.95 for faculty, $15 for students (plus tax, tip, and beverages.)	

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible: ***Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur appui :***

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Abstracts / Résumés

Adam Blair (Stony Brook University), "Phenomenologist as Artist, Artist as Phenomenologist: The Aesthetic Encounter in Merleau-Ponty." How do phenomenologists perceive the world? In this paper, I argue that while Merleau-Ponty thematizes a problematic analytic encounter as contrary to the living world of the prereflective encounter, the phenomenologist must encounter the world in an as-yet-unthematized mode: the aesthetic. The aesthetic encounter is a simultaneous prereflective engagement with the world while catching sight of this experience as it is undergone. I here analyze the structure of this aesthetic mode before seeing how the phenomenologist takes it up in her work. Finally, I turn to late Merleau-Ponty to understand how the artist sees the world through a phenomenologist's eyes to be creative while also letting-things-be.

Susan Bredlau (Emory University), "Losing One's Voice: Merleau-Ponty and the Lived Space of Conversation." In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes a young woman who loses her voice. Her aphonia defies both empiricist and intellectualist explanations and must, Merleau-Ponty argues, be understood as a transformation in her way of being-in-the-world with others; the possibilities that appear to a person who has a voice have ceased to appear to her. Focusing on this idea of the voice as a power for having a certain world, and on the related idea that we can find ourselves cut off from the possibilities that the voice allows to appear, and, as such, lose our voices, I argue that while Merleau-Ponty turns to a rather unusual case to identify and describe the phenomenon of losing one's voice, the phenomenon itself is quite common. Indeed, I suspect that most of us have – at one time or another – lost our voices.

Penelope Deutscher (Northwestern University), "Between the Pleasure Principle: The Limits of 'life death' and Sexual Difference."

Marie-Hélène Desmeules (New School for Social Research), "A Phenomenological Critique of Consent." In many cases, all that is required for a relation to be considered correct is that all parties have given their consent, whereas those for which consent is lacking are considered incorrect. I would like to question this normative primacy granted to consent, going so far as to say consent is not an adequate norm for judging the correctness of the intersubjective relations to which it is said to apply. In order to develop this critical understanding of consent, I suggest carrying out a phenomenological description of consent, going back to some of early phenomenologists' descriptions as a source of inspiration.

Casey Ford (University of Guelph), "The World as a Scene of Risk: Learning in Dewey and Deleuze." This paper brings together two accounts of education and learning, in John Dewey and Gilles Deleuze, which have largely been separated by the intellectual divide between Anglo-American and European thought. It argues that both thinkers situate the experience of learning in terms of a vital and aleatory encounter with the world. This means that learning, before it is abstracted in institutional models and pedagogical procedures, be grasped in terms of the fundamental situation of a living being in a world of alterity, risk, and adaptation. The process of learning should not be understood simply as an individual process of knowledge acquisition, but as an dynamic interchange between the individual and its more than human world. The paper analyzes Dewey's conception of the "environment" as the original context of organic learning, and uses it to give an experiential import to Deleuze's critique of the "image of thought" and representational knowing.

Dave Guignion (University of Western Ontario), "Software and the Simulacrum." This essay disturbs a common understanding of the simulacrum as a force that sequesters reality. I argue that Baudrillard's work on the topic of the simulacrum reveals that what is at risk of disappearing is not reality; it is the other, the unknown, and the indeterminate under the weight of a hyper-rational simulacrum. This may be understood as "integral reality," a moment of reality that exorcises "radical alterity." Integral reality, I argue, finds its correlate in software studies indicative of the work of Wendy Chun. Software is an extension of the logic of "integral reality" — the limit point of

the simulacrum—and we may, by (re)considering Baudrillard, understand this immanent logic of software. I conclude by proposing a term, dyomoíoma— a simulacral binary that structurally resembles the classic binary but evacuates it of all radical potential—to conceptualize Baudrillard's work alongside other contemporary fields still committed to dialectics as method.

Hannah LaGrand (McMaster University), "The Importance of the Private in Hannah Arendt." In this paper I offer a reconsideration of Hannah Arendt's understanding of the private. Arendt's view of the private is often characterized by the violence of the Greek household. However, such a characterization often fails to grasp the much broader role the private plays in Arendt's work. To get the full picture, we must take into account not only her work in The Human Condition, in which the private often seems to be characterized by necessity and oppression, but also her later work in The Life of the Mind. When we do, it becomes clear that Arendt has a robust and positive view of the private—one which is not characterized simply by privation, but also, for example, by the rich and unpredictable nature of thinking. In this way, Arendt's view can offer new insight into what it might mean to value and protect the private.

Mariana Larison (CONICET, Buenos Aires), Title: "Esquisse d'une phénoménologie de l'institution : vers une transtemporalité originaire"

Leonard Lawlor (Penn State University), "The Gift of Time: The Question of the Death Penalty in Derrida." In this essay, I examine Derrida's deconstruction (or critique) of the death penalty in his first set of lectures (*The Death Penalty, Volume 1*). The essay has two parts. First, I reconstruct this deconstruction. I show that the deconstruction depends on the difference between the calculable instant and the incalculable instant. Then, in the second part I show how this difference is based on the deconstruction of temporalization Derrida produced in his 1967 *Voice and Phenomenon*. The deconstruction of temporalization shows that the calculated instant is impossible, and the future, including the instant of my death, remains incalculable. In the essay's Conclusion, I show that the pardon from the death penalty is only a gift of time, only more time or extra time. The pardon can pardon someone from the condemnation to death, but it cannot pardon anyone from the condemnation to die. The pardon can give only a finite survival.

Iain Macdonald (Université de Montréal), "Avalanches II: On Ruben Östlund's "Force majeure." This paper presents a dialectical reading of Ruben Östlund's 2014 film Force majeure: the avalanche at the heart of the film is tied to Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's theses on the pathological tendencies of modern subjectivity. Two lines of interpretation are pursued. First, Östlund's film is compared to the mountain film genre popular in Germany in the 1920s and 30s, criticized by Siegfried Kracauer for its participation in the rise of Nazism. Ernst Jünger's writings are also taken into account. Second, the relationship of cowardice to courage in these films is analyzed and shown not to constitute an opposition but rather a continuum, to which we should oppose what Adorno calls freedom towards the object.

Laura McMahon (Eastern Michigan University), "Palimpsestic Transformations: Religion, Multiculturalism, and Phenomenology as a Critical Practice." In "Algeria Unveiled," Fanon tells the story of women in the Algerian Revolution donning modern French clothing in place of their traditional dress in order to contribute to the revolutionary efforts against French colonialism. This paper uncovers some of the principal lessons of this account through a phenomenological exploration of agency, religion, and political transformation. Part One explores the worldly nature of human agency, in contrast to the Enlightenment stress on individual rationality and autonomy. Part Two discusses the ineluctable significance of religion and tradition in human existence, in contrast to the modern tendency to oppose tradition and modernity, faith and science. Part Three speaks to the nature of intercultural communication and transformation, and makes a case for the political power of phenomenology as a critical enterprise that exposes prejudices and enables more just and emancipatory visions of collective human life and political transformation to come to the fore.

Capucine Mercier (Université Laval) "Corps et sujets : quelles résistances? Le pouvoir productif chez Foucault." Cette communication s'intéresse à la notion de résistance au vu de la conception du pouvoir productif élaboré par Michel Foucault dans La Volonté de savoir. À travers la lecture de Gilles Deleuze et de Judith Butler, je montrerai comment Foucault pense une résistance à la fois du corps et du sujet au pouvoir qui les a produits, tout en laissant de nombreuses questions ouvertes. Le corps est-il entièrement historique, ou est-il ce matériau qui résiste à l'histoire? Y a-t-il une forme de résistance, voire de liberté, plus originaire que le pouvoir dans la subjectivité? Je m'intéresserai à la façon dont Foucault répond, ou non, à ces questions, et à leur reprise par Butler, qui explicite dans Giving an account of oneself le lien intime entre subjectivité et résistance

David Morris (Concordia University), "The Transcendtality of Passivity, and the Contingency of Phenomenology as Institution." Merleau-Ponty's institution lectures advance the insight that genuine actions achieve something new only by not being already contained in their past conditions. Action paradoxically entails passivity. I contextualize this point via Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's radicalizations of transcendental philosophy, showing how this turns phenomenology to radical reflection on conditions accessed only from within embodiment and thereby nature. But nature turns out to confront us with two dimensions of unsurpassable passivity. I then deepen this via the 'hyper-transcendental' argument, that the transcendental condition… of the appearing of transcendental conditions for phenomenological study… is radical passivity, what I call the transcendentality of passivity.

Alexandra Morrison (Michigan Technological University), "The Politics of Anxiety: Precarity and Disorientation in Butler and Ahmed." Beginning with Butler's description of an "ethics of anxiety" queer and feminist political thinkers have, in recent years, taken up the theme of the importance of the disruption of the familiar for critical engagement. By reengaging this theme alongside outsider lives made marginal by the vagaries of corporate capitalism, racism, sexism etc philosophers like Butler and Ahmed have also begun to call specifically for "a politics of disorientation." And yet, they are also reticent, noting that such a politics can't be made an obligation or a responsibility. This paper will delve into meaning of this peculiar politics and outline the underlying reasons for the ambiguity of the call for a politics of anxiety.

Alan Porter (Rice University), "A Supplement for Hägglund's Deflationary Reading of Deconstruction." One of the historically most debated questions of deconstruction concerns its relation to ethics and to politics. In this paper, I provide a basic taxonomy for the various positions taken on this issue, starting with the distinction between "inflationary" readings, which assert a positive relation between deconstruction and ethics and/or politics, and "deflationary" readings, which deny such a relation. I identify the radically deflationary reading of Hägglund (2008) as the most promising, and I compare it to inflationary readings such as Critchley (2014). I then identify the major problem that apparently faces deflationary accounts like Hägglund's—namely, how to account for all the statements in Derrida's writings that imply a positive relation between deconstruction and ethics and/or politics—and I propose a novel solution for dealing with this potential objection, namely, understanding deconstruction as being structured into a formal core (of general method) and an exemplary periphery (of singular application).

Julien Rueff (Université de Montréal), "D'un instrument de connaissance à un « moyen de tenir en laisse ». Critique adornienne de la critique marxiste de l'idéologie." Dans un article intitulé « Contributions à la doctrine des idéologies » ([1954]), Adorno énonce une proposition pour le moins surprenante concernant la critique marxiste de l'idéologie. Alors que cette dernière est communément associée à une connaissance émancipatrice, Adorno pointe en elle des impulsions résolument répressives. Elle serait désormais devenue, dans notre présent historique, un instrument concourant à la négation de la possibilité même d'envisager une alternative à notre réalité sociale. Cette communication entend reconstruire les arguments sur la base desquels le Francfortois se livre à une critique de la critique marxiste de l'idéologie. Il s'agira d'interroger ce qui apparaît comme un paradoxe : pourquoi celle-ci, laquelle visait initialement à mettre à nue les phénomènes de « fausse conscience » dans le cadre de la société bourgeoise du capitalisme industriel, participe-t-elle, avec l'émergence du capitalisme tardif et de la société de masse, à la reproduction d'un ordre social répressif?

Max Schaefer (University of Limerick), "Michel Henry's (Non)Political Philosophy of Life." This paper will explore the implications of Michel Henry's (1922-2002) phenomenology of life on the political world. I begin by laying out Henry's account of how the political world is transcendentally engendered by the non-political affects that belong to the life of the living subject. This will prompt me to question the traditional private-public distinction, as exemplified in the work of Hannah Arendt. I maintain that Henry's work reveals that the private and public realms both arise from the needs of life, and that they both have a role to play in the political life of the living individual. I argue that the forgetting of the basis of the political world in the non-political needs of life leads the political world to become a site of injustice and death.

Dylan Shaul (Vanderbilt University), "Adorno's Critique of Hegel: Melancholia Contra Mourning." This paper deploys Freud's distinction between mourning and melancholia to clarify Adorno's critique of Hegel—Adorno as melancholiac, Hegel as mourner. Adorno's new categorical imperative—to prevent Auschwitz from being repeated—is grounded in the suffering body's materiality and mortality, requiring we tarry with death's negativity by refraining from the work of mourning. In other words, the catastrophe of Auschwitz is fundamentally unmournable; Adorno's negative dialectics is thus precisely a "melancholy science." Hegel's Phenomenology positions mourning qua burial as the first appearance of Spirit proper. If death is life's negation, mourning is that negation's negation—the positive speculative moment. Absolute Knowing itself is a systematic mourning project, a theodicy of historical sacrifice. Adorno rejects Hegel's privileging of Spirit over Nature, his speculative positivity, the Absolute's systematic closure, and any theodicean or sacrificial historicality. For Adorno, Auschwitz is the historical repudiation of the Hegelian equation of the rational and the actual.

Charles Taylor (McGill University), "In conversation" (hosted by Bruce Gilbert [Bishop's University])

Philippe Theophanidis (York University), "Gilbert Simondon et le sunolon : une contribution à la question de l'être." L'œuvre du philosophe français Gilbert Simondon a reçu une attention renouvelée lors de la dernière décennie, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à son travail sur l'objet technique (De Boever, 2012). Toutefois, c'est ici son travail sur la question de l'être qui fera l'objet d'un examen. Spécifiquement, il doit s'agir de comprendre la manière par laquelle Simondon s'approprie le concept aristotélicien de sunolon. Simondon affirme d'une part que le « modèle de l'être », c'est le sunolon. D'autre part, il soutient que le sunolon, ce n'est pas l'individu. Ce faisant, il prend clairement ses distances par rapport au modèle aristotélicien de l'être. La question qui consiste à déterminer le rôle du sunolon au regard du problème de « l'être en tant qu'être » est significative, non seulement pour l'œuvre de Simondon, mais pour l'ensemble du débat, toujours en cours, au sujet du problème de l'être.

Gabriel Toupin (Université de Montréal), "La Bildung comme Pharmakon : une lecture adornienne du concept de culture chez Hegel." Cette présentation explore la lecture dialectique qu'offre Adorno du concept hégélien de Bildung, dans la mesure où il en fait non seulement la critique, mais en sauvegarde les intuitions les plus pérennes. L'idéal hégélien de la culture est à comprendre d'abord comme un concept critique, qui appelle à l'autocorrection constante et à l'ouverture à de nouvelles expériences. Cependant, la Bildung étant destinée pour Hegel à être dissoute en tant que simple moment de l'Esprit absolu, celle-ci en vient éventuellement à prendre une forme mutilée et idéologique, qu'Adorno désigne par le terme « demi-culture ». Ceci étant dit, la Bildung a déjà incarné autrefois les fondements d'une véritable entreprise critique. En somme, la Bildung hégélienne pour Adorno se révèle être à la fois un poison et son propre antidote. Elle en appelle dès lors à sa propre critique immanente, de laquelle émergera la conception adornienne de la culture.

Amie Zimmer (University of Oregon), "Redressing the Feminine: Remedying Levinas' Metaphysics of Shame." I suggest that Levinas' conception of the feminine is primarily indebted to two histories. The first is an inherited theology of clothing; and the second is a subsequent metaphysics of shame. The relationship between the feminine and sexuality is indeed problematic in Levinas: both are indelibly tied to discourses of dress and nudity which functionally reify a normative conception of femininity as that which exists between modesty and shame, itself regulated by norms of dress and clothing. I claim that Irigaray's call in the "Fecundity of the Caress" to 'dress

differently' as a response to Levinas signals an important ethical demand which responds directly to the inherited theology of clothing & metaphysics of shame operative in his ethics.