Mary C. Rawlinson, The Betrayal of Substance: Death, Literature, and Sexual Difference in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Columbia University Press, 2021, 264 pp. ISBN: 9780231199056

Reviewed by Omar Quiñonez, Villanova University

There are many fine entry points to Mary C. Rawlinson’s insightful book, but I will focus my review of The Betrayal of Substance on how it presents “life” as the issue around which the narrative of Hegel’s Phenomenology unfolds. Yet as the title of the book suggests, the thematization of life also serves as an avenue to reconsider the concerns of hyper-rationalism and closure that still haunt the 1807 work. That said, whether we can call these issues a matter of “betrayal” of Hegel’s own philosophical commitments in 1807, as opposed to say, “unresolved issues,” is not a settled question, I think. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth debating and perhaps imperative. 

The first three chapters of the book focus on Rawlinson’s approach to reading the 1807 text. There, Rawlinson presents the concept and inner workings of life as the core problem in the Phenomenology. She notes, for example, that “[i]f for the Greeks man was an animal capable of politics, in ‘our time’ man has become an animal whose politics and philosophy interrogate nothing less than ‘life itself.’ This will prove to have been the ‘real issue’ (die Sache selbst)” (xxix). The phrase “die Sache selbst” plays an almost technical role in the Phenomenology, summarizing the conclusion of the section on Reason that the meaning of self-consciousness is the ultimate subject matter of debate. Thus, if life is die Sache selbst, this means that something about the inner workings of life also involves debate or negotiation.

We are also told that life is best understood as a process of “two-ing,” or entzweien, a kind of logic of “becoming divided” or “splitting up.” On this view, life is a matter of division or multiplication, which would suggest that, with life as die Sache selbst of the book, the Phenomenology is taken to present an account of existence, being itself, as fundamentally open-ended in character. Rawlinson calls this the “material infrastructure of life” (xxi). This is an insightful portrayal of the Phenomenology’s aim and especially helpful in shedding new light on the crucial ¶82 of the introduction, where Hegel explains his reasoning for a “science of the experience of consciousness.” In Hegel’s eyes, experience (Erfahrung) is the product resulting from consciousness’ activity of differentiation and relation to the object of sense. If this connection is right, then The Betrayal of Substance provides new resources to highlight the existentialist basis of the “shapes” of consciousness that make up the Phenomenology’s narrative. On Rawlinson’s account, this drive for investigating “lived experiences” is the result of life’s, and thus being’s, own logic of division calling for self-understanding.

The first part of the book strengthens this existentialist reading of consciousness’ activity through close examination of the section on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Among other topics, this includes a fascinating reconstruction of the figure of the “Bacchanalian revel” in the Phenomenology, an image Hegel, perhaps surprisingly, brings up numerous times. Rawlinson tells us that “Hegel returns yet again to the image of the Bacchanalian revel to articulate the logic of life” (38). The main reference in the Phenomenology is ¶47 of the “preface,” where Hegel cites the festival to the ancient god of wine, Bacchus (“Dionysius” for the Greeks), as a moment of ecstasy where emotions, intoxication, and movement, all work to dissolve fixed identities into the flux of the group. The Bacchanalia portrays a process similar to life’s logic of “two-ing” and consciousness’ differentiation: a radical sense of relationality as open-ended, breaking through individual and social barriers.

This erotic characterization of the “identity-in-difference” thesis and its connection to life has a history in Hegel, appearing in his 1798 “Fragment on Love,” almost ten years before the Phenomenology. On Hegel’s view, love is a “two-ing” in a complex way, for it pushes lovers to differentiate themselves, leaving behind their carved-out space of personal interests and embrace instead the commonality inherent to the loving relation. The Bacchanalian ravel is an image for thinking this open-ended existential logic of life as presented in the Phenomenology, which means, as Rawlinson underscores, that “the differentiated thought positions of philosophy, the historical epochs, and the phases of a life are all necessary, but they belong to a fluidity that surpasses them” (xxxi).  

For this same reason, however, if “fluidity” transcends the multiplicity of life and thought, then what is this “surpassing” itself and how does it relate to its multiplicity? Rawlinson takes the separation between transcendence and transcended to emerge early in the Phenomenology, in the Sense Certainty section that discusses how indexicals (“now,” “here”) are pitted against the plurality of sense experience. The “betrayal” of sensory life is depicted as this separation becoming a fault line and that, in turn, an antinomy, culminating in Hegel downplaying life’s open-endedness. The “betrayal of substance” thus means that life as “two-ing” becomes, ultimately, life as organic totality.

The book presents life as self-dividing and connects this divisibility to the diversity of the experiential “infrastructure of life,” which is best articulated through the science of phenomenology. The “organic metaphor,” as Rawlinson calls it, on the other hand, refers to the internal purposiveness of organic development, which is best suited to a system of conceptual relations. In her words, “[t]he organic metaphor forestalls any possibility of being otherwise. Transgression of the logic of genetic development could never serve life, as it will have been determined in advance to be a genetic defect, a monstrous miscarriage, not a birth” (xxxii). Unlike life’s open-endedness, then, the organism is in principle “closed off,” deploying a pre-determined code of development though itself and for itself. 

Second part of the book recounts how the accumulating moments of tension as the Phenomenology progresses amount to an antinomy of life between open-endedness and organic self-development. The tension is palpable in the chapter on Observing Reason, where science searches for universals in nature to serve as confirmation of the inner rationality of nature’s diversity. Life and nature appear both as the power of diversification and as the rational organization of nature into species. As Rawlinson highlights, “[i]n thinking life as the genus, Hegel distinguished between the flux of becoming and the singular living beings that arise and pass away” (148). Life seems to be in utter tension with itself, being fundamentally, both, mortal and immortal, materially diverse and immaterial self-same (“flux”), open-ended and closed off.

In part three of the book, we are introduced to the full version of the Phenomenology’s antinomy of life and the work’s failure at addressing it. The Phenomenology’s stated aims, that is to justify and present a science of phenomenal knowing, as Hegel restates it in ¶808, wraps up by articulating the conceptual whole (“absolute knowing”) on which the multiplicity of life “hangs together.” On Rawlinson’s account, though, there is trouble here, for this “whole” serves as confirmation that Hegel has not really merged life with organicity, open-endedness with internal self-development. In addressing the antinomy, he has rather subsumed one under the other. This final subsumption, Rawlinson argues, begins in the Culture chapter of the Spirit section, where consciousness’ only way to individualize itself is through the linguistic interpretation of its otherwise generic social roles and titles. Up to this point, the Phenomenology concerned itself with the “problem of consciousness” as set out by ¶82, namely with what it means for experience to be a process of distinguishing and relating to the object of consciousness. But Rawlinson suggests that a new story line develops here that focuses on the process through which universals in language successfully subsume multiplicity.

This is how Hegel gets to re-position the Phenomenology as a “ladder to the system;” as a prelude to the Logic, that is. As she notes, “[w]hen Hegel turns from phenomenology to logic, he leaves behind the phenomenon of incommensurability that on his own account defines organic life” (199). I read the argument here as saying that Hegel subsumes life under “organic metaphor,” thereby turning life as “two-ing” into the closed totality of internal purposive development. This means that Hegel leaves incommensurability behind, translating the open-endedness into the closed organic system of self-development. Hegel betrays his original project, therefore, choosing to address the antinomy of life through the “violence” of the concept: “Hegel has constantly reminded us that the concept is only realized as an infrastructure of life. Yet, he has assiduously tried to tear the concept away from its adherence to the sensuous” (195). 

The Betrayal of Substance points to three examples of “two-ing” as proof of Hegel’s betrayal: the sense of one’s mortality, sexual difference, and the singularity of artistic creation. Each of these cases exemplifies a mode of existence that can be said has incommensurable permutations of meaning. Having subsumed multiplicity under the universality of the concept, the argument goes, these subjects play no meaningful role in Hegel’s final chapters of the Phenomenology. Rawlinson’s formulation strikes me as similar to Thomas Nagel’s argument in defense of experiential facts, where a “perspective-free” language cannot properly present “facts” whose meaning depends on being experienced by a consciousness. Such language would fail to correctly reduce experiential facts to objective facts because it would change what is unique about them.

Let me now close my discussion by asking the following: can Hegel respond to this charge of “hyper-rationalism” that has him “betraying” his own aims as presented ¶82? One way to answer this question would be to ask for clarification on the meaning of Hegel’s “betrayal.” A broad interpretation of the “betrayal” presents the Phenomenology as not only unable to solve the antinomy of life but as actively devaluing multiplicity, the sensuous, and the logic of “two-ing,” portraying the diversity of experience in the objective language of the concept. But one could also read Hegel’s “betrayal” more narrowly, as the articulation of an antinomy in the 1807 that remains unresolved, leading Hegel to move back and forth between devaluing multiplicity, the sensuous, and the logic of “two-ing,” and openly embracing them as fundamental to his definition of consciousness, existence, and even the concept itself.

In terms of the broad interpretation, there are resources in Hegel to reply to the charge.  One example is found at the closing of the Phenomenology, in ¶802, where Hegel reiterates his commitment to the especial place of sense-experience in his theory of knowledge. Hegel’s wording there recalls the Kantian maxim that “concepts without intuitions are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind,” and suggests as well that Hegel sees himself as trying to rethink Kant’s “maxim” in more dynamic terms. Another example is found in the Science of Logic, in Hegel’s discussion of the “concept.” We witness there an uncharacteristically poetic Hegel connecting the inner workings of the “concept” (Begriff) to the divisibility of life and that, in turn, to “love” as a non-violent “free power,” circling all the way back to the 1798 “Fragment on Love.” The concept is presented as the backdrop to divisibility and multiplicity, explaining how it all “hangs together.” Understood in this way, then, one could argue that Hegel remains faithful to the “problem of consciousness” as laid out in ¶82.

And yet what Hegel sees himself as doing and what he does may not be the same. The Betrayal of Substance makes a strong case, in my view, for how the model of organicity to which Hegel subscribes is in tension with Hegel’s own understanding of consciousness as self-divisible. Given that the Phenomenology aims to explain the “problem of consciousness” in ¶82, it is perhaps unsurprising and yet troubling that the book progressively focuses on the “unity” side of the equation, on the relating of consciousness to the object, rather than on divisibility, on consciousnesses’ distinguishing. Consider Rawlinson’s objection to Hegel’s discussion of art in the Phenomenology. Though art in 1807 is for Hegel part of the religion, he shows no interest in individual artistic “style,” speaking of art and artworks as if they had only historical and social functions. That is, as if art was an instance, a sensible manifestation, of otherwise broad historical patterns. But this does not do justice to art, for we speak of “a Van Gogh” and “Homeric poetry” not because they are instances of universals but rather because these are irreducibly singular examples of artistic creation. As a form of “absolute knowing,” the book is no longer trying to illustrate consciousness’ “two-ing.” It has shifted to articulate and, one may argue, privilege, how “it all hangs together.” In my view, it is in the more restricted sense of an unresolved tension in Hegel that Rawlinson’s judgement against the “absolute” standpoint rings true: “[i]n the end, there can only be one narrative of spirit, a master narrative, for the mastery of difference. Religion absorbed art: the absolute one absorbed the indelible multiplicities of style” (193).

Hegel may not be so easily labeled as a metaphysician of presence. But as Rawlinson shows, he seems to be a thinker torn between his appreciation for the diversity of experience and the explanatory potential of a self-justifying philosophical system. Putting the finger on this tension-turn-antinomy is what The Betrayal of Substance does so well.